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ARBITRATION WITH TWO TWISTS: LOEWEN V. UNITED
STATES AND FREE TRADE COMMISSION INTERVENTION
IN NAFTA CHAPTER 11 DISPUTES
STEFAN MATIATION*
1. INTRODUCTION
O'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc.,' the Mississippi jury trial that re-
sulted in a $500 million damage award against a Vancouver-based
funeral home company, could well be the inspiration for a movie
like South Park,2 the American adult cartoon film that is filled with
many quirky references to Canada. One can imagine a satirical
scenario depicting the arrival of a wealthy Canadian funeral home
consolidator in a small town in Mississippi to take over a local fu-
neral home operation and add it to its expanding "death industry"
empire. The locals fight back, meting out local justice in the court-
room, causing the Canadian consolidator to scurry northward, his
reputation and business in tatters. The episode closes with the
cheery chanting of "Blame Canada," the theme song from the South
Park movie.
In this case, however, the story is neither satire, nor has it
reached its conclusion. The Loewen Group Inc. ("Loewen"), with
the doors of Mississippi justice firmly closed behind it, has made
its case again, thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA").3 This time, Loewen did so before three arbitrators
appointed pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11 in a claim in which the
United States is the respondent. Not unexpectedly, Loewen v.
* B.A. University of Manitoba, 1992; LL.B. University of Toronto, 1995;
LL.M. Columbia University, 2002. The Article was first prepared in
partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Author's Master
of Laws program.
I0'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., No. 91-67-423 (Miss. Circ. Ct. 1st Jud. Dist.,
Hinds County 1995).
2 SOUTH PARK: BIGGER, LONGER AND UNCUT (Paramount Pictures 1999).
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 289-
605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
United States4 ("the Loewen Claim") has become one of a handful of
NAFTA investor claims derided by opponents of NAFTA and of its
intended successor, the proposed Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas ("FTAA").5
Loewen's central allegation is that the Mississippi proceedings
amount to a denial of procedural and substantive justice contrary
to the minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA and interna-
tional law. A decision respecting the issue of denial of justice in
Loewen was expected in Spring 2002. The matter was delayed,
however, when the United States filed a submission dated March 1,
2002, arguing that Loewen cannot continue its Chapter 11 claim
because it was taken over by an American company.6 A NAFTA
Chapter 11 claim only permits an investor of one NAFTA Party to
bring a claim against another NAFTA Party.7 An American inves-
tor cannot avail himself of Chapter 11 to seek redress against the
U.S. government. A decision respecting this jurisdictional issue is
expected at any time.
Although the issue of denial of justice in Loewen will be moot if
the arbitration panel concludes that the company is no longer "an
investor of another party,"8 the claim still provides a useful entry
4 NAFTA Arbitration: Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No.
ARB[AF]/98/3 [hereinafter Loewen Group, Inc.]. The final award has not been is-
sued in this case. However, all of the parties' submissions are available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3755.htm (last visited May 2, 2003).
5 For the draft of FTAA, see THE CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (commenting on
various provisions being considered and discussing the Department's position
with respect to those provisions), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/ftaa-neg-en.asp (last visited May 2, 2003).
6 For progress of Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, see Memorial of the
United States on Matters of Jurisdiction and Competence, Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States (Mar. 1, 2002), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
8744.pdf; Counter-Memorial of the Loewen Group, Inc. on Matters of Jurisdiction
and Competence, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Mar. 29, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/9360.pdf; Reply of the United
States to the Counter-Memorial, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Apr. 26,
2002), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/9947.pdf; Rejoinder of
the Loewen Group, Inc., Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (May 24, 2002), at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10611.pdf.
7 NAFTA Chapter 11 applies to measures adopted or maintained by a party
(i.e., Canada, the United States, or Mexico) relating to: (a) investors of another
party; and (b) investments made by investors of another party in the territory of
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point for a discussion of the minimum standard of treatment in
NAFTA and the role of the NAFTA Free Trade Commission. The
arbitrators have been asked to determine what constitutes denial of
justice under NAFTA, and whether the Mississippi proceedings
failed to live up to the requisite standard. The United States has
generally been an advocate for a high minimum standard of treat-
ment in proceedings in which it has pursued international claims
on behalf of its nationals and in negotiations respecting investment
agreements. In this case, however, it seeks the application of a
lower standard. The U.S. position is that it is difficult for claimants
to successfully meet the requirements for such claims and that de-
nial of justice should give rise to remedies only in extreme circum-
stances.9
On July 31, 2001, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, which is
composed of the trade ministers for each of the NAFTA Parties, is-
sued its first interpretation of NAFTA provisions pursuant to Arti-
cle 1131(2).10 By issuing this interpretation part way through the
proceedings, the NAFTA Parties may have undercut one founda-
tion for Loewen's argument. Ironically, in light of the central issue
in Loewen, it has been suggested that the Commission's action is it-
self contrary to principles of fairmess and justice.
This Article is not intended to determine whether or not the
Loewen Claim should succeed (regardless of the outcome of the ju-
risdictional issue). Instead, it uses the Loewen Claim as a basis from
which to discuss the Commission interpretation of July 31, 2001
and the minimum standard established by NAFTA Chapter 11 for
the treatment of NAFTA Party investors, along with some implica-
tions arising from these matters.
Although the Loewen Claim is used as a point of entry for this
discussion, many of the issues addressed below have broad impli-
cations. The minimum standard of treatment has been called the
alpha and omega of investor-to-State arbitration under Chapter 11
of NAFTA, with every award rendered against a NAFTA Party to
9 See Counter-Memorial of the United States, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United
States (Mar. 30, 2001), at 130-31 [hereinafter U.S. Counter-Memorial] (discussing
the difficulties in making a denial of justice claim in international law), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/7387.pdf.
10 See NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chap-
ter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Commission Interpretation on Chapter 11],
available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-e.asp.
2003]
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date resting at least in part on a failure to uphold it." As set out in
NAFTA Chapter 11, the standard poses vexing challenges to its in-
terpreters. Despite its recent intervention, the Commission may
not have markedly reduced this feature. The manner in which the
Commission interpretation is applied by the arbitrators in Loewen
and in other pending cases may have an impact on the future of
NAFTA. Further, States involved in FTAA negotiations or that
have entered into bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") with the
United States, on which Chapter 11 is largely based, have an inter-
est in reviewing the U.S. arguments in Loewen respecting the
minimum standard, along with the views expressed by the NAFTA
Parties in relation to the Commission interpretation, and may
wonder whether they amount to a retreat. The fact that the Com-
mission has found it necessary to weigh in on the issue of the
minimum standard suggests that the investor-to-State dispute
resolution system is anything but a simple mechanism for interna-
tional commercial arbitration and raises important questions about
the nature of that system.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE LOEWEN CLAIM
2.1. O'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc.12
Raymond Loewen took his father's small town funeral home
operation and expanded it into the second largest in North Amer-
ica, prior to the Mississippi fiasco. Loewen's expansion in that
state led to a commercial contract dispute with Jeremiah O'Keefe,
11 Charles H. Brower II, Fair and Equitable Treatment Under NAFTA's Invest-
ment Chapter, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 9, 9 (2002) [hereinafter Brower, Fair and
Equitable Treatment] (setting out concerns with the Commission's interpretation
issued on July 31, 2001).
12 O'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., No. 91-67423 (Miss. Circ. Ct. 1st Jud.
Dist., Hinds County 1995). See generally Notice of Claim, Loewen Group, Inc. v.
United States (Oct. 30, 1998) [hereinafter Notice of Claim] (setting out Loewen's
claims against the United States), at http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/ 3922.pdf; U.S. Counter-Memorial, supra note 9; Michael I. Krauss, NAFTA
Meets the American Torts Process: O'Keefe v. Loewen, 9 GEo. MASON L. REV. 69
(2000) (setting out an overview of the Loewen Claim); Ren~e Lettow Lerner, Inter-
national Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil Justice System in an Era of Global Trade,
2001 BYU L. REv. 229, 235-44 (2001) (discussing Loewen as an example of "the
challenges a foreign litigant may face in state court and how suits may be brought
against the U.S. government to compensate the foreign investor under NAFTA").
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the owner of a Mississippi family funeral home business. After set-
tlement efforts failed, the dispute ended up in the Circuit Court for
the First Judicial District of Hinds County, a Mississippi state
court.
O'Keefe hired a well-known trial lawyer named Willie Gary.'3
In its NAFTA pleadings, Loewen suggests that Gary spent little
time addressing the intricacies of tort or contract law during the
proceedings. Instead he and his associates targeted three main is-
sues: (1) Ray Loewen's nationality; (2) his purported racism and
deceitfulness; and (3) his wealth.14 Loewen argues that Gary also
used large numbers liberally and without reference to factual ma-
terials, admonishing the jury by the end of the trial to teach Ray
Loewen and his company a lesson by bringing back a punitive
damage award of $1 billion, even though this number had no rela-
tion to the initial value of the contracts on which the dispute was
based, or to the actual net worth of the Loewen Group.'5 The Gary
team also compared the dispute to the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor 16 and to alleged unfair trade practices by Canadian farm-
ers. 17 It is suggested in the Loewen Notice of Claim that Judge
Graves "repeatedly allowed Gary to make irrelevant and highly
prejudicial comments that inflamed the passion of the jury and ul-
timately produced a grossly excessive verdict."18
Lawyers for the United States paint a different picture of the
facts in their pleadings, suggesting, through expert evidence, that
Loewen's legal team simply made repeated errors and poor deci-
sions during the proceedings, always a possibility in an adversarial
setting.19 Further, the United States suggests that at least some of
13 See Krauss, supra note 12, at 76-78 (describing Willie Gary).
14 See Notice of Claim, supra note 12, paras. 52-103 (outlining the manner in
which these three themes were emphasized by counsel for O'Keefe during the
proceedings).
15 Id. para. 116. In O'Keefe v. Loewen Group, Inc., the jury returned the verdict
of $500 million, which was seventy-eight percent of Loewen's net worth based on
its June 30, 1995, financial statements and over one hundred times the value of the
principal subjects of the contractual disputes. Id. para. 117.
16 Id. para. 103.
17 Id. para. 100.
18 Id. para. 40. Loewen's lawyers apparently objected to allusions to
Loewen's nationality by counsel for O'Keefe on more than fifty occasions, but
were overruled each time. Krauss, supra note 12, at 77.
19 U.S. Counter-Memorial, supra note 9, at 132-33.
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the attacks against Loewen in the courtroom were intended to
demonstrate that Loewen's behavior towards the smaller Missis-
sippi operation was indeed heavy-handed and reprehensible. 20
Although the contracts at issue in the trial were worth less than
$10 million, the jury ultimately returned a verdict of $500 million,
of which $400 million represented punitive damages.21 Following
the proceedings, the jury foreman is reported to have made a pub-
lic statement that Ray Loewen "was a rich, dumb Canadian politi-
cian who thought he could come down and pull the wool over the
eyes of a good ole Mississippi boy. It didn't work."22 If Loewen is
correct, the judgment appears to have come about as a result of the
extraordinary performance of O'Keefe's lawyer, a malleable jury,
and a complicit judge.23
Making matters worse for Loewen, Mississippi law requires
appellants to post a bond of 125% of the judgment in order to ap-
peal, which amount can be reduced for "good cause." 24 The $625
million appeal bond required in this case was almost equal to the
entire net worth of the Loewen Group. Judge Graves rejected
Loewen's proposal that it provide a bond of $125 million, which
represented 125% of the compensatory damages award, conclud-
ing that there was no good cause for a reduction and that no re-
duced bond would adequately protect O'Keefe's interests.25 The
Mississippi Supreme Court concurred with Judge Graves and or-
dered Loewen to post the bond within seven days of its decision.26
In its Counter-Memorial, the United States argues that the Court's
judgment was partly the result of actions by Loewen that under-
20 Id. at 139-40.
21 Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 117. See id. paras. 22-34 (describing
the commercial contract dispute that led to the litigation and the $500 million ver-
dict); Krauss, supra note 12, at 72-76 (detailing the background information of the
parties and their attorneys). See also Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 6 (stating
Loewen's claim that the contracts at issue were worth less than $5 million in the
aggregate).
22 Nina Bernstein, Brash Funeral Chain Meets its Match in Old South, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 17,1996, at A6, quoted in Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 143.
23 The trial was so theatrical that Warner Bros., Inc. has reportedly acquired
the movie rights. See Paul Magnusson, The Highest Court You've Never Heard Of,
Bus. WK., Apr. 1, 2002, at 77.
24 Krauss, supra note 12, at 84.
25 Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 124.
26 Id. para. 126.
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mined its credibility. While Loewen argued in court on one hand
that it could not post the bond, it suggested to shareholders on the
other that it could if necessary.27
During the week following the Mississippi Supreme Court de-
cision, negotiations between Loewen and O'Keefe continued.
Krauss argues that there was bargaining room between the parties
because the plaintiffs wanted to avoid "the likely reversal if
Loewen somehow did appeal, and the prospect of competing with
other creditors if Loewen was [sic] forced into bankruptcy."28 Ac-
cordingly, the parties eventually reached a settlement for $175 mil-
lion.29
In November 1998, Loewen filed its claim under NAFTA Chap-
ter 11, currently before a panel of arbitrators under the auspices of
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID") Additional Facility. Loewen seeks $175 million from the
United States, representing the amount of its allegedly forced set-
tlement with O'Keefe and the damages it argues it suffered from
the Mississippi judgment, in particular in relation to its stock price
and other operations.30
Loewen's shares plummeted in value after the damage award
became public and it was forced to sell off some of its assets (in-
cluding some Mississippi-based operations which it sold to
O'Keefe). It has since been taken over by a U.S.-based company.
The panel is now considering arguments as to whether Loewen
meets the application provisions of NAFTA Chapter 11 such that it
can make a claim against the United States. A decision respecting
this issue is expected at any time. Even though Loewen's challenge
to the Mississippi judicial system will be moot if the panel decides
that Loewen is no longer a Canadian-based investor, its claim is
still of significance thanks to the interest it has generated and the
questions about investor-to-State dispute resolution it has raised.
2.2. Loewen v. United States31
27 U.S. Counter-Memorial, supra note 9, at 156-57.
28 Krauss, supra note 12, at 86.
29 Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 127.
30 Id. para. 186.
31 Loewen Group, Inc., supra note 4.
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The Loewen Claim was the first Chapter 11 arbitration based on
allegations that judicial proceedings were so deficient as to amount
to a denial of justice under NAFTA and international law. A panel
decision in Mondev International Ltd. v. United States, a Chapter 11
claim raising the issue of denial of justice, was issued on October
11, 2002.32 In that case, the panel considered whether a Massachu-
setts court's decision to uphold a statutory immunity protecting
regulatory authorities in Massachusetts from suit for interference
with contractual relations between state authorities and private
parties amounted to a contravention of NAFTA Chapter 11. The
panel concluded that it did not on the basis that the statutory im-
munity was a matter falling within the legislative competence of
Massachusetts. 33
The NAFTA negotiators may not have expected that Chapter
11 would be used to attack judicial activities. Likely, it was par-
ticularly unexpected that denial of justice allegations would first,
and to date only, be mounted against the United States. However,
although the Loewen Claim is innovative, precedent exists in inter-
national dispute resolution for claims based on questionable judi-
cial proceedings. 34 Indeed, with roots in the period that followed
the decline of the Roman Empire, the concept of denial of justice
has played an important role in the development of the framework
of international law.35
Relying both on the text of NAFTA and on other arbitral and
judicial decisions, on January 5, 2001, the Loewen tribunal issued a
32 NAFTA Arbitration: Final Award, Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, (Oct. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Mondev], available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 14442.pdf.
33 Id. at 54-56.
34 Many cases arose in the early part of the twentieth century when some de-
veloping countries, particularly in Latin America, attempted to regain control of
their domestic resources from American and other foreign companies through na-
tionalization and expropriation. See generally CUTS CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL
TRADE, EcONOMIcs & ENVIRONMENT, MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL INVESTMENT
NEGOTIATIONS: WHERE CAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES MAKE THEMSELVES HEARD?,
Briefing Paper No. 9/2002, available at http://cuts.org/9-2002.pdf (last visited
May 2, 2003).
35 See Hans W. Spiegel, Origin and Development of Denial of Justice, 32 AM. J.
INT'L L. 63 (1938) (discussing the history and development of the concept of denial
of justice in international law); ALWYN V. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL OF JUSTICE 54-55 (1938) (providing compre-
hensive review and analysis of the history of denial of justice in international law).
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decision respecting a preliminary objection by the United States as-
serting that judgments of domestic courts in private disputes are
not "measures adopted or maintained by a Party" within the scope
of Article 1101(1) of NAFTA, 36 which is the application provision
of Chapter 11. The tribunal rejected this objection on the basis that
Article 201 of NAFTA defines "measure" as including "any law,
regulation, procedure, requirement or practice,"37 all of which can
refer to the judicial process in various ways.38
In its claim, Loewen alleges that the Mississippi judicial process
violated NAFTA provisions barring discrimination by a Party
against investors of another Party and their investments (Articles
1102 and 1105), requiring that Parties uphold a minimum standard
of treatment for investments of investors of another Party (Article
1105), and barring uncompensated or discriminatory expropriation
of such investments by a Party (Article 1110).39 This Article ad-
dresses the minimum standard of treatment under NAFTA, which
is the issue that receives the most attention in the pleadings. In-
deed, Loewen is to date the Chapter 11 claim that most extensively
canvasses the question of the meaning of the minimum standard,
albeit in relation to the narrower issue of denial of justice. Under
the heading "Minimum Standard of Treatment," Article 1105(1)
provides that "[e]ach Party shall accord to investments of investors
of another Party treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and se-
curity."40
Before turning to an examination of the minimum standard, the
following paragraphs outline the issues raised in relation to the
first and third allegations (discrimination and expropriation).
Loewen argues that the introduction of anti-Canadian testi-
mony and counsel comments during the trial violated Articles 1102
and 1105.41 The failure of the trial judge to control such testimony
36 NAFrA, supra note 3, art. 1101(1).
37 Id. art. 201.
38 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision on Hearing of Respondent's
Objection to Competence and Jurisdiction (Jan. 5,2001) [hereinafter Loewen Deci-
sion on Hearing on Competence and Jurisdiction], at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/3921.pdf.
39 Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 139.
40 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1105(1).
41 Notice of Claim, supra note 12, paras. 139-43.
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permitted counsel for O'Keefe to inflame the jury, leading to the
excessive judgment.42 Article 1102 provides that each NAFTA
Party "shall accord to investors [and investments of investors] of
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in
like circumstances, to its own investors [and investments of inves-
tors] with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of
investments." 43 With reference to Article 1105, Loewen argues that
"[ulnder international law, an alien is entitled to an impartial trial
untainted by invidious discrimination." 44
Article 1110 of NAFTA provides: "No Party may directly or
indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor
of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment," except for
a public purpose, on a non-discriminatory basis, in accordance
with due process of law and Article 1105, and upon payment of
compensation.45 Loewen argues that the excessive verdict, denial
of Loewen's appeal rights, and coerced settlement violated Article
1110 by: interfering with Loewen's property rights to a degree tan-
tamount to expropriation, for which it received no compensation;
serving no public purpose (only a private windfall to O'Keefe); and
failing to satisfy the due process and minimum standard of treat-
ment requirements.46
The foregoing shows the central importance to Loewen's claim
of the allegation respecting the minimum standard of treatment.
Essentially, Loewen submits that the trial process, the verdict, the
denial of an appeal, and what it refers to in its pleadings as the
"coerced settlement" all amount to a denial of substantive and pro-
cedural justice, contrary to applicable requirements of NAFTA
Chapter 11 and international law.47 Although Loewen's claim can
be successful if it establishes any one of its allegations- each of
which is an independent ground for a claim under NAFTA Chap-
ter 11-the allegations are interrelated in this case. Issues relevant
42 Id. para. 40.
43 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1102(1).
44 Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 141.
45 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1110(1).
46 Notice of Claim, supra note 12, para. 167.
47 See id. paras. 144-61 (summarizing Loewen's argument).
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to an assessment of fair treatment in judicial proceedings underpin
all three.
Krauss argues that Loewen was "victimized by a judicial sys-
tem it did not anticipate" and by a "farcical judgment" that "ar-
guably had little to do with either tort or contract law and much to
do with factors unwritten in any Mississippi Code." 48 The evident
bias of the jury and trial judge has led to suggestions that Loewen
provides a solid rationale for tort reform in the United States.49
That the U.S. judicial system is open to scrutiny in the same way
that less developed countries' systems sometimes are-and may
even require reform-may come as a surprise to many Americans.
3. ELEMENTS OF THE STRUCTURE OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11
3.1. The Controversy
The possibility that a company like Loewen can lose in court
but turn around to sue the United States directly for denial of jus-
tice has attracted the ire of NAFTA opponents. Thanks to cases
such as Loewen, Chapter 11 "has become a lightning rod for oppo-
nents of globalization and the intrusion of international law into
domestic affairs."5 0 In materials on its website, Public Citizen-the
48 Krauss, supra note 12, at 98.
49 See id. at 93 ("The outcome of the Loewen case could ... have far-reaching
consequences for the American tort reform movement...."); Lerner, supra note
12, at 235 (arguing that bias in state courts justifies amendment of the complete
diversity requirement for removal of an action to federal court). The complete di-
versity rule provides that if any defendant is from the state of the plaintiff, the
matter cannot be removed to the federal court. Id. at 237. In O'Keefe v. Loewen, the
plaintiffs named as defendants some local businesses that Loewen had invested
in, thereby preventing removal even though the target of the action was Loewen
itself. Lerner argues that there is a substantially lower chance of bias against out-
of-state defendants at the federal court level. Id. at 235-61. A judge's failure to
suppress courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to a foreign defendant has been
found to amount to a breach of the minimum standard of treatment. Id. at 260-61.
The United States was successful in a 1933 arbitration against Panama in which
the Presiding Commissioner concluded that the trial had been improperly influ-
enced by "strong local sentiment." However, in that case, the source of the in-
citement of hostility against the United States was the Panamanian government
itself rather than participants in the adjudication. Solomon v. Panama (U.S. v.
Pan.), 6 R.I.A.A. 370, 373 (1933).
50 Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: The Empire
Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 43, 44 (2001) [hereinafter Brower, Investor-
State Disputes] (discussing concerns with judicial intervention in Chapter 11 deci-
sions through judicial review proceedings and providing an overview of investor-
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Washington-based non-profit public interest organization founded
by Ralph Nader, and one of the more prominent detractors of
NAFTA Chapter 11-suggests that "Loewen is seeking to use
NAFTA to force U.S. taxpayers to pay for its legal missteps and
failed courtroom strategy,"5' and that Loewen is posing a direct
challenge both to the jury system and to the concept of punitive
damages. 52 Regardless of the merits of Loewen's claim, it has been
suggested that one "need not be a friend of Public Citizen to be
alarmed by the prospect of what an incautious panel of arbitrators
could do with [claims such as Loewen's] or the backlash against in-
ternational arbitration that [a decision in Loewen's favor] could
provoke .... 53
Loewen and other Chapter 11 claims have given rise to a vis-
ceral debate not only about international arbitration, but about the
notion of investor rights as a whole. Brower notes that recent de-
velopments "horrify Canadian and U.S. publicists, who denounce
the 'aggressive' use of investor-state arbitration as an 'offensive'
weapon that has 'chilled' the exercise of regulatory authority and
caused an 'alarming' loss of sovereignty."5 4 More specifically, con-
cerns have been raised that provisions requiring national treat-
ment, the Most Favored Nation Standard, a robust minimum stan-
dard of treatment, and arguably enhanced protection against
uncompensated expropriation are such that the potential cost to
the NAFTA parties arising from Chapter 11 disputes "may well
discourage desirable or even necessary" regulation-making,
particularly in the environmental field55 and the field of public
to-State arbitration). The Columbia Journal of Transnational Law published a re-
sponse to Brower's article by Christopher Thomas, along with Brower's reply, in
the third edition of volume 40. See generally J.C. Thomas, A Reply to Professor
Brower, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 433 (2002); Charles H. Brower II, Beware of Jab-
berwock: A Reply to Mr. Thomas, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 465 (2002).
51 PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES:
BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY 21 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ACF186.pdf.
52 Id. at 20.
53 Jos6 E. Alvarez, How Not to Link: Institutional Conundrums of an Expanded
Trade Regime, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 18 (2001) [hereinafter Alvarez, Institutional
Conundrums]. See also id. at 16-19 (discussing Loewen).
54 Brower, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 50, at 45-46.
55 David A. Gantz, Potential Conflicts Between Investor Rights and Environmental
Regulation Under NAFTA's Chapter 11, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 651, 656 (2001)
[hereinafter Gantz, Potential Conflicts]. Cf. MANN & VON MOLTKE, INTERNATIONAL
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health.56 Loewen shows that non-regulatory State measures, such as
judicial processes, are also not immune to Chapter 11 review.
A variety of measures have been proposed to address NAFTA
concerns, including "a retreat from liberal access to investor-state
arbitration, adoption of binding interpretive statements to limit the
substantive obligations of Chapter 11, or establishment of a per-
manent appellate body to review decisions of Chapter 11 tribu-
nals."57 To date, only one of the foregoing approaches has been
adopted. The first Commission interpretation issued pursuant to
Article 1131 of NAFTA, is discussed in more detail below. In addi-
tion, two arbitral decisions have made their way to the Canadian
judicial system via applications for judicial review.5 8 Further, in re-
lation to FTAA negotiations, the Canadian Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade states on its website that its posi-
tion is that it does not favor the replication of the NAFTA investor-
to-State dispute settlement mechanism in the FTAA,5 9 although
negotiations to date are proceeding on the basis that a similar
model will be included. 60 Before turning to a discussion of the
INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: ADDRESSING THE IMPACTS OF THE INVESTOR-STATE PROCESS ON THE
ENVIRONMENT 7 (1999) ("The risk brought by such uncertainty... may lead to a
regulatory freeze."), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/nafta.pdf.
56 See generally Samrat Ganguly, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM)
and a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113
(1999).
57 Brower, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 50, at 46.
58 To date, two arbitral awards, Metalclad v. United Mexican States and S.D.
Myers v. Canada, have been made the subject of judicial review applications in Ca-
nadian courts pursuant to NAFTA Article 1136 and the applicable arbitration
rules in those cases. A decision has been rendered in the judicial review of Metal-
clad upholding almost the entire amount of the compensation awarded by the ar-
bitral tribunal, but overturning most of the substantive reasons given for the
award. See United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 BCSC 664 [hereinafter
Metalclad in Canada], available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/documents/trans-2may.pdf; Canada v. S.D. Myers, 2002 FCA 39, available at
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/myers-judgment-e.pdf. For
more discussion about judicial review of NAFTA Chapter 11 decisions, see Chris
Tollefson, Metalclad v. United Mexican States Revisited: Judicial Oversight of
NAFTA's Chapter Eleven Investor-State Claim Process, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 183
(discussing the judicial review of the Metalclad decision).
59 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA): Draft Chapter on Investment- Canada's Position, Proposals and
Notes, para. 22, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/-P%26P-en.asp (last
updated Mar. 6, 2003).
60 Such a model appears in the Draft of U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agree-
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Commission Statement and the minimum standard, it is useful to
review some of the key elements of the controversial investor
rights provisions of NAFTA.
3.2. The Innovation: Investor-State Arbitration
The most significant innovation of NAFTA Chapter 11 is that it
allows an investor from one NAFTA Party to directly sue another
NAFTA Party in which that investor has an investment. The Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement,61 which NAFTA replaced,
did not include such a provision. Although BITs have included in-
vestor-to-State arbitration provisions for many years, NAFTA is
the first multilateral trade agreement that includes such a provi-
sion.
From an investor's perspective, Chapter 11 represents a vast
improvement over the customary international law norm whereby
only a State can take action against another State. In the State-to-
State model, the injured investor is relegated to lobbying its gov-
ernment to press its claim. A government that decides to espouse
such a claim acts on its own behalf and according to its view of the
best interests of its broad constituency, rather than according to the
best interests of the injured investor alone (at least theoretically).
Diplomatic channels or agreed-upon dispute resolution procedures
in which the only parties are the two States are generally the means
of dispute resolution that are available (other than armed conflict).
Under the customary approach, States control the entry into dis-
pute resolution, the process, and-to an extent that is dependent
on the form of the chosen dispute resolution procedure -the out-
come.
It has been suggested that the investor-to-State model in Chap-
ter 11 fundamentally changes the complexion of transnational dis-
ment. The provision in that agreement addressing the minimum standard of
treatment reflects the principles set out in the Commission Statement. See Draft
U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Mar. 7,2003, at http://www.ustr.gov/
new/fta/Singapore/consolidatedtexts/2%20-20market %20access%20-
20release.PDF.
61 Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1989).
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putes involving alleged injuries to investors.62 Beyond the exigen-
cies of diplomacy-where no decision to arbitrate on a State-to-
State level can be taken without a view to international relations,
public and foreign policy, and the development of international
law-NAFTA Chapter 11 investor-to-State disputes take place in a
realm in which the cost of proceedings may be the predominant
control. Since it is relatively inexpensive at least to commence such
proceedings, which can in itself bring relief,63 this can seem like lit-
tle control at all. Other than costs, which can be ordered in accor-
dance with the applicable arbitration rules,64 there is no penalty for
filing frivolous claims and no expedited process to handle them.65
Of course, the longer proceedings take, the more the Parties invoke
judicial review of arbitral awards, and the more the Commission
intervenes in pending cases, the more expensive they become.
Further, existing outside the realm of diplomacy, NAFTA
Chapter 11 is an example of an adversarial dispute resolution
method, a system of dispute resolution that is most strongly asso-
ciated with the U.S. legal tradition, although it is practiced -some
would argue more moderately-in Canada as well. A Canadian
Department of Justice lawyer has remarked: "I know from per-
sonal experience that the arbitrations are bellicose and fought with
no quarter. This is one of the features that distinguish investor-
state dispute settlement from NAFTA Chapter 20 state to state dis-
pute settlement."66
NAFTA Chapter 11 is divided into two parts. Part A sets out
the substantive obligations of the Parties. Part B sets out the rules
respecting the investor-to-State dispute resolution procedure. The
62 See generally J. C. Thomas, Investor-State Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter
11, 37 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 99 (1999) (explaining NAFTA Chapter 11 from a
practical perspective).
63 For example, instead of proceeding with a Chapter 11 arbitration submit-
ted by Ethyl Corporation, Canada settled with the company for $11 million as an
apology and a retraction of proposed measures. See Submissions in Ethyl Corp. v.
Canada, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ethyl-en.asp (last visited May
2, 2003).
64 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1135(1).
65 Daniel Price, Speech at New York University School of Law Conference:
Regulatory Expropriations in International Law (Apr. 26, 2002) (calling for the
creation of an expedited process).
66 Joseph de Pencier, Investment, Environment and Dispute Settlement: Arbitra-
tion Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 409, 410
(2000).
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purpose of Part B is to establish a "mechanism for the settlement of
investment disputes that assures both equal treatment among in-
vestors of the Parties in accordance with the principle of interna-
tional reciprocity and due process before an impartial tribunal." 67
With the establishment of this mechanism, the Parties appear to
explicitly recognize - and attempt to avoid - the risk of bias in na-
tional courts (as arguably occurred in O'Keefe v. Loewen).
It is important to note that a Chapter 11 arbitration is a new
and distinct proceeding based on allegations that a NAFTA Party
failed to uphold its treaty obligations, not an appeal from a domes-
tic judgment nor a form of judicial review of an administrative de-
cision. Loewen's claim is therefore not an attempt to overturn the
damage award in O'Keefe v. Loewen. Indeed, Chapter 11 confers no
such authority upon the arbitrators charged with considering
Loewen's allegations. Article 1135 of NAFTA provides that an ar-
bitral tribunal may award only monetary damages and any appli-
cable interest, restitution of property (in which case monetary
damages and any applicable interest can be paid in lieu of restitu-
tion), and costs pursuant to the applicable arbitration rules.68 Puni-
tive damages are not available, nor can tribunals order a new trial
or order administrative officials to reconsider a regulatory deci-
sion.
Each NAFTA Party gave its consent to Chapter 11 arbitration
when it entered into the agreement.69 Provided that six months
have elapsed since the events giving rise to a dispute, an investor
may submit a claim to arbitration by consenting in writing "to arbi-
tration in accordance with the procedures set out in [NAFTA]" and
by providing a written waiver of its right to "initiate or continue
before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any
Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings
with respect to the measure" that is the subject of the dispute.70
Chapter 11 disputes are addressed by a tribunal consisting of three
arbitrators: one appointed by each of the two parties to the dispute
(always consisting of a NAFTA Party and an investor of another
67 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1115.
68 Id. art. 1135(1).
69 Id. art. 1122(1).
70 Id. art. 1121(1).
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Party), and a third appointed by agreement of both.71 Failing
agreement within 90 days, the third arbitrator is appointed by the
Secretary General of ICSID, with the presiding arbitrator selected
from a roster established by the Parties.72
A claim to arbitration can be submitted under the Convention
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States ("ICSID"), the Additional Facility Rules of the ICSID,
or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
Arbitration Rules ("UNCITRAL). 73 In practice, the first option is
not available, since neither Mexico nor Canada is party to the Con-
vention. Both the disputing Party and the Party of the investor
must be parties to the Convention in order for it to be invoked.
On its face, Chapter 11 dispute resolution therefore appears to
be based on a typical commercial arbitration model in which the
disputing parties rely on a panel with expertise in business and
trade to resolve the issues between them. However, in NAFTA,
the model has been given two twists. The first twist is found in Ar-
ticle 1131 of the Agreement, which sets out the governing law pur-
suant to which Part B tribunals are to resolve Part A issues that
come before them. Most notable is the paragraph respecting
Commission interpretations:
1. A Tribunal established under this Section shall decide the
issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and
applicable rules of international law.
2. An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of
this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established
under this Section. 74
Part B tribunals are therefore charged with resolving disputes
based on allegations that Part A obligations have not been met in
accordance with: (1) NAFTA; (2) applicable rules of international
71 Id. art. 1123.
72 Id. art. 1124(2)-(4).
73 Id. art. 1120.
74 Id. art. 1131.
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law; and (3) any interpretations issued by the Commission. Since it
followed the issuance of the first Commission interpretation on
July 31, 2001,75 less than three months before the Loewen tribunal
was scheduled to hear oral argument, the Loewen Claim provides
an interesting example of the interaction of the three elements of
governing law applicable to Chapter 11 dispute resolution.
The second twist is hinted above in the discussion of the con-
troversy surrounding NAFTA. In short, Chapter 11 dispute resolu-
tion does not occur in isolation: tribunal awards can have implica-
tions for issues of public policy and the common good. In this
regard, Chapter 11 arbitration is anything but typical commercial
arbitration, as it involves much broader issues than contract
interpretation or business valuation.
4. THE COMMISSION (FINALLY) INTERVENES
4.1. The Commission Statement
Investors engaged in Chapter 11 disputes can be expected to
make innovative arguments that may advance the development of
international law in their interests and to satisfy their immediate
needs rather than longer-term goals.76 The fact that the NAFTA
investment chapter includes protections for rights against dis-
crimination, to due process, to security, to nationality, to freedom
of movement, and to own property and not be arbitrarily deprived
of it-all of which can be enforced against the three NAFTA Parties
directly by investors -has led Alvarez to call the chapter "the most
bizarre human rights treaty ever conceived." 77 Armed with such
an instrument, it should come as no surprise that investors have
brought cases under Chapter 11 that likely were not anticipated by
NAFTA negotiators.
75 See Commission Interpretation on Chapter 11, supra note 10.
76 See Thomas, supra note 62, at 102 ("Investors do not have the same long-
term interest in the agreement's NAFTA interpretation, and, therefore, they may
advance claims uninhibited by any discipline.").
77 Jos6 E. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment's Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 307 (1997) [hereinafter
Alvarez, Critical Theory] (analyzing NAFTA Chapter 11 through the application of
critical theory and suggesting that NAFTA reinforces some inequalities that exist
among and within the NAFTA parties).
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The increasing number of unanticipated cases and presumably
unexpected results, particularly against Canada, led its Trade Min-
ister, Pierre Pettigrew, to write in an article published in The Finan-
cial Post in March 2001: "I am concerned that recent tribunal deci-
sions related to Chapter 11 go beyond the original intent of its
drafters to protect investors from harmful actions by governments.
I want investors' rights to be clearly stated and agreed upon, but I
also want them to be properly interpreted." 78
Prior to the issuance of the Commission Statement, Canada was
the most frequent target for investor claims and had raised objec-
tions to Chapter 11 procedures most persistently, at times calling
on the Parties to issue interpretations to guide arbitrators.79 While
it seemed unlikely that this would occur for a time given the early
dearth of claims against Mexico and the United States, the momen-
tum shifted following the decision in Metalclad v. Mexico8 and with
the filings by the Methanex Corporation and Loewen against the
United States. A growing public chorus against the investor rights
provisions of NAFTA, especially following the successful civil so-
ciety-driven attack against the OECD-proposed Multilateral In-
vestment Agreement, which was discarded partly due to concerns
about investor-to-State arbitration,81 has contributed to conditions
favoring intervention by the NAFTA Parties.
78 Pierre S. Pettigrew, We Need to 'Clarify' NAFTA to Fix Tribunal 'Errors,'
FINANCIAL POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at C19.
79 See INTERNATIONAL INSTITrTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, NOTE ON
NAFTA COMMISSION'S JULY 31,2001, INITIATIVE TO CLARIFY CHAPTER 11 INVESTMENT
PROVISIONS (analyzing the Commission Statement by the IISD), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2001/trade-naftaaug200l.pdf; Ganguly, supra note
56, at 165-66 (using Canada's healthcare system as an example of areas in which
additional guidance is needed for arbitrations); Gantz, Potential Conflicts, supra
note 55, at 691-701 (detailing the arguments in several of Canada's cases under
Chapter 11 arbitrations); COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, NAFTA'S BIG BROTHER: THE FREE
TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS AND THE THREAT OF NAFTA-STYLE "INVESToR-STATE"
RULES (discussing the concerns of the Council of Canadians, a Canadian public
interest organization, with NAFTA Chapter 11 and its possible replication in the
FTAA), available at http://www.canadians.org/displayjdocument.htm? COC_
token=1@@4b64f163bf64bc530602cd220ble6e94&id=109&isdoc=1 (last visited
May 2, 2003).
80 See NAFTA Arbitration: Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36
(2001) [hereinafter Metalclad Corp.] (finding that Mexico must pay $16,685,000 to
Metalclad Corporation), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/
documents/Award-e.pdf.
81 Alvarez, Institutional Conundrums, supra note 53, at 15-16 ("It failed for a
variety of reasons.").
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In light of this convergence of interest, the NAFTA Commis-
sion issued notes interpreting certain provisions of Chapter 11 in
accordance with Article 1131(2) for the first-and so far only-
time, on July 31, 2001.82 The 2001 statement might not be the last.
A joint communique, released by the Commission on the same day
as the interpretation, indicates that the Ministers "directed experts
to continue their work examining the implementation and opera-
tion of Chapter 11, including developing recommendations as ap-
propriate." 83 The International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment calls the prospect of continuing discussions between the
NAFTA Parties about Article 1131(2) interpretations as remarkable
as the issuance of the first Commission Statement itself, noting pro-
tracted battles in the U.S. government about what to do with Chap-
ter 11 and Mexico's erstwhile steadfast rejection of the idea that
there might be a problem.84 Besides its possible impact on current
and future disputes, the Commission interpretation is of great in-
terest because, if successful, it highlights that investor-to-State
Chapter 11 proceedings are not the same as international commer-
cial arbitration. At this point, however, it is not clear whether the
Commission interpretation "clarifies" anything about Chapter 11.85
Immediately upon release, the Commission Statement became
a hot topic in pending Chapter 11 disputes. In November 2001, the
legal teams acting for Mexico, Canada, the United States, and
82 See Commission Interpretation on Chapter 11, supra note 10. See also NAFTA,
supra note 3, art. 1131(2) ("An interpretation by the Commission of a provision of
this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal.").
83 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Joint Statement of the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission Building on a North America Partnership, July 31, 2001, available at
http://www.mae.doc.gov/nafta/ar-july3l.html.
84 INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 79.
85 Since being issued, the Commission Statement has been disparaged by the
panel considering the Pope & Talbot case and applied by the panel in Mondev. The
Mondev panel applied the statement on the basis that Article 1105 incorporates the
heightened minimum standard of treatment set out in BITs, which is contrary to
the position taken by the Commission in its statement. See News Release for Award
in Respect of Damages by Arbitral Tribunal, Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Can-
ada, (May 31, 2002), para. 65 [hereinafter Pope & Talbot] (indicating that it rejects
Canada's view of the minimum standard of treatment at customary international
law); see also Mondev, supra note 32, para. 125 (outlining the Tribunal's somewhat
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Loewen each filed submissions addressing its impact.86 The debate
can also be followed in submissions that have been made in the
Methanex proceedings, including an opinion prepared by the emi-
nent international law expert, Sir Robert Jennings, assailing the
Commission for what he views as an abuse of due process.87
The Commission interpretation addresses two topics: access to
documents and the minimum standard of treatment. With respect
to the standard, the Commission states:
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of in-
vestors of another Party.
2. The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full
protection and security" do not require treatment in addi-
tion to or beyond that which is required by the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another
provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international
86 See generally Submission of the Government of Canada Pursuant to NAFTA
Article 1128, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Can-
ada's Article 1128 Submission], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/6327.doc; Second Article 1128 Submission of the United Mexican
States, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Mexico's
Article 1128 Submission], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organi-
zation/6362.pdf; Response of the United States of America to the November 9,
2001 Submissions of the Governments of Canada and Mexico Pursuant to NAFTA
Article 1128, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Dec. 7, 2001) [hereinafter U.S.
Response to Article 1128 Submissions], available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/6926.pdf; Joint Reply of the Claimant the Loewen
Group Inc. and Raymond Loewen to the November 9, 2001, Article 1128 Sub-
missions of Canada and Mexico, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Dec. 7,
2001) [hereinafter Loewen Joint Reply to Article 1128 Submissions of Canada and
Mexico], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6919.pdf.
87 Second Opinion of Professor Sir Robert Jennings, Q.C., Methanex Corp. v.
United States (Sept. 6, 2001) [hereinafter Jennings Second Methanex Opinion]
(supporting Methanex), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/commis-
sion.htm.
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agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach
of Article 1105(1).88
The Commission's effort to address the issue of access to
documents is not surprising since the investor-to-State dispute
resolution procedures have been pilloried for their secrecy.8 9 At
first blush, the decision to address Article 1105 may appear some-
what curious because of the attention that the expropriation provi-
sion, Article 1110, has received in academic and public interest
commentary.90 In its 1999 report on NAFTA Chapter 11 and the
environment, the International Institute for Sustainable Develop-
ment called on the Commission to issue an interpretation clarifying
the meaning of the national treatment provision in an environ-
mental, context, the relationship between environmental trade
measures and the performance requirement prohibitions, and the
scope of the expropriation provisions.91 With respect to the mini-
mum standard, the report asserts:
The minimum standard of treatment is well established as
part of the historical development of international law in
this area. While it may be difficult to define with precision,
it is a standard that is less likely to impact on bona fide, non-
discriminatory measures than other issues addressed here.
88 Commission Interpretation on Chapter 11, supra note 10. Very briefly summa-
rized, with respect to access to documents, the Parties agreed that nothing in
NAFTA imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing parties to a
Chapter 11 arbitration and that nothing in NAFTA precludes the Parties from
providing public access to documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter 11 tri-
bunal, subject to Article 1137(4).
89 See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 51, at x-xi ("The regulatory takings pro-
visions of Article 1110 has drawn the most fire, but the trade ministers refuse to
provide an interpretation of the provision or in any way limit its use....");
COUNCIL OF CANADIANS, supra note 79 (discussing concerns about NAFTA Chapter
11).
90 See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 55, at 4-5 ("Most worrying in the
NAFTA context is the lack of clear guidelines to help distinguish between takings
subject to compensation and regulation that is not."); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 79 ("The NAFTA Ministers need to
state clearly that non-discriminatory laws serving broad public interests such as
environment and public health should enjoy the police powers exemption from
Article 1100 obligations.").
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As a result, it is recommended that this issue not be seen as
a priority for intervention. 92
This statement belies the central role that the minimum stan-
dard has come to play in all NAFTA Chapter 11 disputes just four
years after the report was released. In an article published in 2001,
David Gantz states that in the face of growing opposition to
NAFTA, business interests are particularly concerned about pre-
serving the minimum standard of treatment as a "fair and equita-
ble" standard.93 The absolute nature of the minimum standard, but
lack of precision both as described in Article 1105 and under inter-
national law, makes it a source for investor creativity, and of con-
sternation for the NAFTA Parties. In addition, its appearance in
Article 1110 as a standard that must be met by a party that directly
or indirectly nationalizes or expropriates an investment of an in-
vestor of another party, and its buttressing effect as an absolute in-
ternational standard - applicable where the relative national
treatment and most favored nation standards fall short of interna-
tionally acceptable norms for the treatment of alien investors-
make it a provision of pervasive importance to Chapter 11 dispute
resolution.
4.2. Is the Commission Statement Effective?
4.2.1. Mhat Is the Statement Intended to Do?
The Commission Statement is an attempt to address a number
of features attributed to the minimum standard by claimants and
arbitrators. First, it has been argued that the minimum standard of
treatment in Article 1105 is not merely the customary international
law standard but is heightened by the phrases "fair and equitable
treatment" and "full protection and security." 94 By this view, the
provision protects investors not only from actions that are contrary
to the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
92 Id. at 34.
93 David A. Gantz, Reconciling Environmental Protection and Investor Rights Un-
der Chapter 11 of NAFTA, 31 ENvTL L. REP. 10,646, 10,646 (2001) (analyzing the im-
pact of NAFTA Chapter 11 on environmental regulation).
94 See, e.g., Notice of Claim, supra note 12, paras. 159-62 (demonstrating the
use of the phrases).
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for alien investors, but also from actions that might not contravene
that standard but are nevertheless unfair, contrary to rules of eq-
uity, or do not accord full protection and security. In other words,
investors are protected by each phrase: "international law," "fair
and equitable," and "full protection and security," independent of
the other. Read together, it is argued that these phrases give inves-
tors both the benefit of an absolute minimum standard of treat-
ment and the more generous context specific principles of fairness
and protection that can be applied with more flexibility than the
customary international law standard.95 The interpretation at-
tempts to eliminate this argument by interpreting the word "in-
cluding" in Article 1105, in a way that suggests that the additional
principles are subsumed in some manner under the customary in-
ternational law norm.
It has also been suggested that the phrase "in accordance with
international law" in Article 1105 must be broadly interpreted to
include any standard of treatment that an investor might be enti-
tled to under international law, whether arising within the four
comers of Article 1105, Chapter 11, all of NAFTA, or any other
treaty that applies to the NAFTA Parties either because it consti-
tutes a statement of relevant customary law or because it is a treaty
that the Parties have ratified. For example, according to one of the
arbitrators in S.D. Myers v. Canada,96 the interpretation and applica-
tion of Article 1105 must "also take into account the letter or spirit
of widely, though not universally, accepted international agree-
ments like those in the World Trade Organization ("WTO") system
and those typical of BITs." 97 The arbitrator goes on to accept the
view proposed by counsel for S.D. Myers that relevant WTO and
BIT principles should apply even if the norms they have expressed
have not yet technically passed into customary international law.98
95 See, e.g., Letter submitted by counsel for Methanex respecting the Commis-
sion Statement of July 31, 2001, Methanex Corp. v. United States, (Sept. 18, 2001),
at 7-11 [hereinafter Methanex Letter] (arguing that the "near-universal adoption of
these investment protections shows that they are now principles of customary in-
ternational law"), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com.
96 S.D. Myers v. Government of Canada, Separate Opinion by Dr. Bryan
Schwartz, concurring except with respect to performance requirements, in the
Partial Award, Nov. 12, 2000, para. 234, available at
http://www.appletonlaw.com.
97 Id.
9S Id. paras. 256-57.
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Adopting a similar approach, Methanex argues that the WTO
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade requirement that regula-
tions be as "least trade restrictive" as possible also applies to
NAFTA.99
With respect to BITs, the argument would be that the principle
in, for example, the U.S. Model BIT -whereby investors are to re-
ceive treatment in accordance with international law and fair and
equitable principles -should apply to Article 1105 despite the dif-
ference in wording between the relevant Model BIT provision and
the minimum standard provision in NAFTA.100 This issue is dis-
cussed in more detail below. By this view, Article 1105 should be
interpreted and applied as a standard that is higher than the mini-
mum standard of treatment applicable to alien investors under cus-
tomary international law. Each of the paragraphs in the part of the
Commission Statement addressing Article 1105 resists this view.
Third, before it was overturned by the Supreme Court of Brit-
ish Columbia, the Metalclad decision rested in part on a determina-
tion that a principle of transparency applies to Chapter 11 as part
of the fairness and equity provided for in Article 1105.101 At issue
in that case was a conflict between a decision at the federal level
approving a project and a municipal refusal to allow it to pro-
ceed.102 The federal authorities had assured the proponent that
federal approval was all that was required.103 The tribunal inter-
preted Article 1105 to include a requirement that the investor be
accorded a transparent regulatory approval process, which was
99 See William T. Warren, Paying to Regulate: A Guide to Methanex v. United
States of America and NAFTA Investor Rights, 31 ENVrL. L. REP. 10,986 (2001) (dis-
cussing the Methanex Claim and its impact on environmental regulation).
100 See LEGAL ADVISOR OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, UNITED STATES MODEL
BILATERAL INvEsTMENT TREATY AND SAMPLE PROVISIONS FROM NEGOTIATED BITs art
2(1) (1984) [hereinafter U.S. MODEL BIT] ("Investments... shall in no case be ac-
corded treatment less than that required by international law."), reprinted in Pat-
rick Jude DeSouza, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in the United States
1973-1993 and the Making of American Foreign Economic Policy (1994) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with University of Penn-
sylvania Biddle Law Library).
101 See Metalclad Corp., supra note 80, para. 76 ("Prominent in the statement of
principles and rules that introduces the Agreement is the reference to 'transpar-
ency.'").
102 Metalclad in Canada, supra note 58, paras. 2-18.
103 Id. para. 8.
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breached as a result of the misleading federal assurances. 0 4 This
interpretation was based on the fact that "transparency" is men-
tioned in Article 102 of NAFTA, which sets out the objectives of the
Agreement. Although Mr. Justice Tysoe of the British Columbia
Supreme Court decided that he did not need to make a ruling on
the point, he did indicate in his decision that the principle of trans-
parency in Article 102 is elaborated on in Chapter 18 of NAFTA
independently of Chapter 11, and is therefore not incorporated in
Article 1105.105 Similar to the Metalclad decision, a majority of the
tribunal in S.D. Myers concluded that a breach of Article 1102 es-
tablishes a breach of Article 1105, in part because the minimum
standard was considered broader in scope than the national treat-ment provisions. 0 6 It appears that another objective of the Com-
mission Statement is to eliminate arbitrators' reliance on provisions
other than 1105 to establish a violation of that Article.
4.2.2. The Role of the Commission
Before turning to a discussion of criticisms that have been ad-
vanced in relation to the Commission Statement, it is useful to re-
view the role of the Free Trade Commission within the framework
of NAFTA. The following statement in Canada's November 2001
submission'0 7 in the Loewen claim addresses what it regards as
Loewen's misunderstanding of the nature of NAFTA as a treaty, of
the provisions of the Agreement, and of the Commission's struc-
ture and functions. The November 2001 submissions of Mexico
and the United States include statements that reflect similar posi-
tions, or that express agreement with Canada: 0 8
1o4 See Metalclad Corp., supra note 80, para. 72.
105 Id. para. 71.
106 See Gantz, supra note 55, at 712 ("[A] majority of the Tribunal determined
that 'on the facts of this particular case Canada's breach of Articles 1102 essen-
tially establishes a breach of Article 1105 as well,' in part because the 'minimum
standard' was considered broader in scope.").
107 See Canada's Article 1128 Submission, supra note 86, para. 18 (providing
Canada's comments with respect to Article 1102 and with respect to the Commis-
sion interpretation). Article 1128 entitles a non-disputing party to NAFTA to
make submissions on a question of interpretation of the Agreement in Chapter 11
disputes.
108 See generally Mexico's Article 1128 Submission, supra note 86; U.S. Re-
sponse to Article 1128 Submissions, supra note 86, at 2 ("[Bjoth Mexico and Can-
ada observe correctly that, pursuant to NAFTA Article 1131(2), the July 31, 2001
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The role of the NAFTA Parties as disputing parties, capital
exporters, recipients of investments of other Parties and as
sovereign states with a clear interest in the proper operation
of the NAFTA transcends the merits of specific cases. Act-
ing in their plenary capacity as the Commission, the Parties
act as the guardians of the Treaty. They have the legal right
to clarify the meaning of the obligations that they agreed to
undertake and have specified in the NAFTA a mechanism
for doing so. This right was not only negotiated in the
NAFTA; it was also approved by the legislatures of each
Party when the NAFTA was ratified and implemented.10 9
Together, the critique of the Commission Statement and the
foregoing description of the nature of NAFTA, reflect a tension
that exists between the notion of state sovereignty and the interna-
tional rule of law. Brower suggests the issue has implications be-
yond the sphere of international economic law. "[O]pponents of
Chapter 11 should not assume that we can reinvigorate sover-
eignty at the expense of individual rights in economic matters
without jeopardizing the capacity of international law to promote
other forms of individual rights."" 0 Nevertheless, Brower does not
* argue that the NAFTA Parties' Article 1131 authority is entirely
neutered by international law. The question is, are there any con-
straints on the ability of the Commission to issue interpretations of
their free design? The foregoing statement by Canada hints that it
thinks the Commission's authority to interpret NAFTA is unfet-
tered. A review of the Commission's role within the framework of
NAFTA suggests that this is not the case.
The Commission was established pursuant to Article 2001 of
NAFTA. It is made up of cabinet-level representatives of the Par-
ties who are responsible for trade, or their designates."' The Com-
mission is empowered to:
Interpretation of the Free Trade Commission ("FTC") is part of the governing law
in this case and that the FTC's interpretation is binding on this and other tribunals
constituted under NAFTA Chapter Eleven.").
109 Canada's Article 1128 Submission, supra note 86, para. 18.
110 Brower, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 50, at 87-88.
111 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 2001(1).
20031
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
(a) supervise the implementation of [the] Agreement;
(b) oversee its further elaboration;
(c) resolve disputes that may arise regarding its interpreta-
tion or application;
(d) supervise the work of all committees and working
groups established under [the Agreement]; and
(e) consider any other matter that may affect the Agree-
ment's operation."12
It may establish and delegate responsibilities to committees,
working groups or expert groups, seek advice, and take such ac-
tion in the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree.1 3 It
elaborates its own rules and procedures and must take decisions
by consensus, convening at least once a year.114 In addition, the
Commission is responsible for overseeing a Secretariat established
pursuant to Article 2002.115 The Commission's Article 1131(2) au-
thority therefore derives from its institutional responsibilities and
powers as the principal organ of NAFTA.
The Commission's institutional character places limits on its
roles and functions. First, although it is intimately linked to the
executive level of each of the NAFTA Parties, it operates within a
distinct and defined framework that has substantial independence
from the Parties and their broader political objectives. To illustrate,
this means that the Commission's responsibility to oversee the fur-
ther elaboration of NAFTA may conflict with responsibilities of the
executive of each NAFTA Party to, for example, oversee the en-
actment of environmental regulations or develop public health
policies. Further, the role of Canada's Minister of Trade as a mem-
ber of the Commission may conflict with his role as a Member of
Parliament representing the interests of a particular riding in the
City of Montreal. In both illustrations it is not a question of one set
of obligations and powers giving way to the other; but rather, it is
more accurate to view each set as being different. Canada's Minis-
ter of Trade and the other members of the Commission essentially
112 Id. art. 2001(2).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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wear at least two hats. This should not be disregarded as a simple
matter of semantics. It is an important distinction that reflects the
framework that the Parties established when they entered into
NAFTA. The Parties do not themselves have a legal right, pro-
vided for in NAFTA, to interpret the Agreement.116 Rather, it is the
Commission that has the responsibility and power, but not right, to
do so, pursuant to Articles 2001(2) and 1131(2)117 and within the
framework of the Agreement. The Parties have the right to change
the NAFTA contract through a new or modified agreement, but
not through the mechanism available pursuant to NAFTA to the
institution of the Commission.
Second, because the Commission is established by the Parties
in accordance with NAFTA to carry out a contained list of func-
tions set out in the Agreement, it must do so in accordance with
any applicable limits arising from the terms or character of the
Agreement. For example, NAFTA is a treaty between States within
the meaning of Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties." 8 Accordingly, it is governed by international law. Ap-
plicable rules of international law may therefore place limits on the
Commission's interpretive creativity.
These comments respecting the nature of the Free Trade Com-
mission, the principal institutional organ of a North American free
trade regime established by a multilateral treaty, provide a useful
prelude to a discussion of the specific concerns that have been
raised about the Commission Statement.
4.2.3. Reasons to Question the Impact of the Statement
The Commission Statement has been challenged on a number
of grounds. Brower identifies several reasons to question the im-
pact of the statement on the interpretive flexibility of arbitral tribu-
nals in his notes for remarks that he delivered at the annual meet-
116 See Canada's Article 1128 Submission, supra note 86, para. 18 ("[Tlhe Par-
ties act as the guardians of the Treaty.").
117 See NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1131(2) (explaining that any Commission
interpretation is binding to Tribunals); Id. art. 2001(2) (listing the rights and duties
of the Free Trade Commission).
118 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 333, 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 1 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) ("The pre-
sent Convention applies to treaties between States.").
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ing of the American Society of International Law in March 2002.119
Brower draws on comments made by Sir Robert Jennings in his
submission in support of Methanex in its Chapter 11 proceed-
ings.120 The September 18, 2001, Methanex submission 2' and De-
cember 7, 2001, Loewen submission outline similar issues.122 The
most compelling challenges leveled against the Commission
Statement are outlined below, followed by a reply.
First, Brower suggests that the statement might be ultra vires
the authority of the Commission on the basis that it is an attempted
amendment rather than an interpretation of NAFTA. 123 Brower ar-
gues that the interpretation relies on words that are not in Article
1105 and ignores words that are there. In the following quotation,
Jennings states that nowhere does Article 1105 incorporate interna-
tional law standards applicable to "aliens":
[O]n this first proposition of the Free Trade Commission, it
is an ingenious diversion inviting examination of the com-
plicated area of the general international law concerning
the treatment of aliens. But this is not what Article 1105 is
about. It is about the minimum treatment of the invest-
ments of an investor of another Party to the NAFTA
Agreement. Article 1105 does not anywhere mention either
the term 'customary' or the term 'alien." 24
It is not only the words used that raise the amendment versus
interpretation issue. Brower argues that the relegation of "fair and
119 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11.
120 Jennings Second Methanex Opinion, supra note 87.
121 Methanex Letter, supra note 95.
122 Loewen Joint Reply to Article 1128 Submissions of Canada and Mexico,
supra note 86.
123 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 11.
124 Jennings Second Methanex Opinion, supra note 87, at 3. This statement
appears to be contrary to the following view expressed by Jennings in his earlier
Loewen affidavit: "[T]o establish what is meant by the minimum standard [Article
1105] has to refer to general international law which has long traditionally defined
the requirements of a minimum standard for the treatment of aliens -the treat-
ment of aliens generally and not only in terms of investment." Opinion of Sir
Robert Y. Jennings, Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States (Oct. 26, 1998), para. 30
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equitable treatment" to no more than a customary international
law standard and the purported elimination of any opportunity to
consider external treaties fundamentally alter the role of arbitral
tribunals.125 The Commission Statement reduces the flexibility
available to arbitrators to interpret the vague terms "fair" and "eq-
uitable" and the statement arguably amends the governing law
prescribed by Article 1131 by eliminating the opportunity for arbi-
trators to rely on the full array of sources of international law.126
Second, Brower argues that the Commission is bound to issue
interpretations that comply with applicable rules of international
law,127 including Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, the first paragraph of which provides that "[a] treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary mean-
ing to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose." 128 On the basis that the Commis-
sion Statement is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the
words of Article 1105, counsel for Methanex submits that it is "ir-
relevant and ineffective." 129
Third, Brower argues that even if the Commission Statement
constitutes a binding interpretation of Article 1105, arbitral tribu-
nals still must have the opportunity to construe its words, along
with the words of other relevant provisions of NAFTA and appli-
cable international law, in accordance with Article 1131.130 He
raises the possibility that tribunals might view the Commission in-
terpretation as a statement of opinio juris to the effect that, through
widespread incorporation into BITs, the standard of "fair and equi-
table treatment" has become a rule of customary international
law.131
Finally, Brower argues that regardless of whether the statement
is within the authority of the Commission, it must still be deter-
mined whether it is applicable to pending disputes such as Loewen
125 See Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 11.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 118, art. 31.
129 Methanex Letter, supra note 95, at 6.
130 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 10.
131 Id.
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and Methanex.132 Certainly, the NAFTA Parties would like to think
so. In this regard, Jennings states:
It would be wrong to discuss these three Party 'interpreta-
tions' of what have become key words of this arbitration,
without protesting the impropriety of the three govern-
ments making such an intervention well into the process of
arbitration, not only after the benefit of seeing the written
pleadings of the parties but also virtually prompted by
them.... This is surely against the most elementary rules of
the due process of justice.... It is very sad to see this pre-
sent betrayal of principles of which the United States has
long been the revered author and practitioner.133
Two rules of international law are regarded as relevant by Brower:
equal treatment of the parties to a dispute, and the principle that
no one may be the judge of her own cause.134
4.2.4. Reply to the Foregoing Challenges to the Commission State-
ment
The first and second concerns outlined above relate to the
boundaries of Commission authority, suggesting that: (1) the
Commission interpretation is actually an amendment; and (2) the
Commission has failed to exercise its interpretive authority in ac-
cordance with applicable international law. The third concern re-
lates to the meaning of the Commission Statement itself, suggest-
ing that it might be interpreted by arbitrators as confirmation that
Article 1105 incorporates the standard of treatment contained in
BITs. These three concerns are intended to uphold the view cham-
pioned by investors that Article 1105 establishes a heightened
standard, that is, a higher standard than the standard generally ac-
cepted under customary international law. The fourth concern-
that the Commission does not have the authority to apply its inter-
pretations to pending disputes -is directed not at the meaning of
132 Id. at 6.
133 Jennings Second Methanex Opinion, supra note 87, at 5-6.
134 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 12.
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the standard, but at the role of the Commission. The first and sec-
ond concerns are addressed together.
Based on the earlier discussion about the role of the Commis-
sion within the framework of NAFTA, it is correct to assert that the
Commission is not at liberty to amend the Agreement and that the
Commission must exercise its interpretive authority within the
scope of the applicable rules of international law. However, this
understanding does not provide convincing grounds for the con-
clusion that the Commission has failed to satisfy its tasks. It is first
helpful to recall that the key phrases at issue in Article 1105(1) are:
"in accordance with international law" and "including fair and equi-
table treatment and full protection and security."135 The italicized
words are particularly important to the debate.
The argument that the Commission Statement is an amend-
ment, not an interpretation- and therefore should have been un-
dertaken by the NAFTA Parties under the purview of NAFTA's
amendment procedures (including a requirement for legislative
approval) - is only a concern if Article 1105 cannot reasonably be
interpreted in a way that is considered with the Commission
Statement. A reasonable interpretation is one that satisfies rules
applicable to the interpretation of international treaties-the most
prominent being the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.136
In accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the in-
terpretation of a treaty is not to be based simply on the ordinary
meaning of words, but on their contextual meaning. 137 There are a
number of considerations respecting Article 1105 that are relevant
because of the contextual implications of its location in Part A of
Chapter 11. First and foremost, it is relevant to consider the posi-
tion of Article 1105 in relation to other standard-setting provisions
in Chapter 11.
Article 1105 follows the provisions in NAFTA that describe the
National Treatment and Most Favored Nation standards. Article
1102 provides that each Party shall accord investors and invest-
ments of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it ac-
cords, in like circumstances, its own investors and investments.
Article 1103 provides that "each Party shall accord to investors and
135 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1105(1) (emphasis added).
136 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 118.
137 Id. art. 31.
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investments of another Party treatment no less favorable than that
it accords, in like circumstances, to investors and investments of
any other Party or of any non-Party." 138 Article 1104 provides that
"each Party shall accord the better of the treatment required by Ar-
ticles 1102 and 1103." 139 These Articles set out relative standards.
They do not say that a Party cannot establish unfavorable condi-
tions for all foreign investors, nor do they require that a Party man-
dates any particular level of treatment. Rather, they establish that
a Party cannot discriminate against investors of other Parties or
treat these investors less favorably than it does investors of non-
Parties.
Article 1105 appears in Chapter 11 as a separate third standard.
As suggested by its heading-Minimum Standard of Treatment-
the Article establishes a minimum standard of treatment of the in-
vestments made by investors of another Party.140 It is included to
ensure that an absolute minimum standard of treatment will be ac-
corded investors where National and Most Favored Nation treat-
ment falls short. The standard could be regarded either as a floor
against which domestic measures of a government can be tested or
as a fall-back standard that applies when a Party treats both its
own nationals and foreign investors badly.141 Of course, in Chapter
11 proceedings, it is generally alleged that a number of provisions
of Part A have been breached. There is no reason to assume at the
outset, however, that a breach of one of these provisions necessar-
ily results in a breach of another. For example, a Party could fail to
treat an investment of an investor of another Party as well as it
treats investments of its own nationals in violation of Article 1102,
but nevertheless accord treatment to that investor's investment that
is better than that required by Article 1105. Although this does not
resolve what the Article 1105 minimum standard is, it suggests that
it need not be assumed that it is necessarily a heightened standard.
Further, it is relevant to consider the objectives of NAFTA. Ar-
ticle 102(1)(c) lists increasing "substantially investment opportuni-
138 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1102.
139 Id. art. 1103.
140 See id. art. 1105.
141 See Canadian Department of External Affairs, Canadian Statement of Imple-
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ties in the territories of the Parties" 42 as one of the objectives. This
is a general objective of the whole Agreement, not just of Article
1105 itself. There is no reason to conclude that this objective can
only be satisfied if the minimum standard of treatment provision
in Chapter 11 is a heightened standard.
When interpreting a provision in accordance with Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention, it is as important to interpret it in context
as it is to interpret its words in good faith in accordance with their
ordinary meaning.143 In this regard, it is important to note that the
wording of Article 1105 and that of the similar provision in the U.S.
Model BIT are different. Alvarez has referred to NAFTA as "a U.S.
bilateral investment treaty on steroids -a dream come true for the
U.S. foreign investor." 144 Although NAFTA contains many provi-
sions drawn from BITs-and it is crucial to an understanding of
Chapter 11 to review its genesis in bilateral agreements -it is im-
portant not to ignore their differences. It cannot be assumed, as
appears to have been the case among the arbitrators in Pope & Tal-
bot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, that NAFTA provisions mean the
same thing that related BIT provisions do.145
Article 11(2) of the Model BIT provides that investments shall be
accorded "fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection
and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than
that required by international law."146 Article 1105(1) describes
treatment "in accordance with international law, including fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security." 147 The provi-
sion expresses an overall concept such that the phrases "fair and
equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" cannot be
read in isolation. It can be argued that while the U.S. Model BIT
142 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 102(1)(c).
143 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 118, art. 31.
144 Alvarez, Critical Theory, supra note 77, at 304.
145 See Gantz, supra note 55, at 698-700 (discussing the arbitrators' conclusion
that the "fair and equitable treatment" provision in NAFTA should be construed
broadly).
146 U.S. MODEL BIT, supra note 100, art. 2(2) (emphasis added). Canada's ver-
sion of BITs contains a similar provision to the U.S. model BIT. See The Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada's Foreign Invest-
ment Protection and Promotion Agreements (FIPAs) Negotiating Programme, para. 17
(guaranteeing investors a level of minimum treatment), at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/whatjfipa-en.asp#what (last updated Dec. 6,2002).
147 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1105(1) (emphasis added).
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clearly envisages a level of fair and equitable conduct which goes
beyond the minimum standard required by international law due
to the use of the word "and," in Article 1105 the reference to fair
and equitable treatment is included in the international minimum
standard of treatment. It is not unreasonable to infer that by draft-
ing Article 1105 in the way they have, the NAFTA Parties have
purposely established a standard that is lower than that set out in
the U.S. Model BIT. Indeed, Gantz notes that the view that "there
is a denial of fair and equitable treatment [under 1105] only if the
subject action is a violation of customary international law" was
accepted by the tribunal in S.D. Myers, by the British Columbia
Supreme Court in its Metalclad review, and by the Metalclad tribu-
nal itself.148 Prior to the issuance of the Commission interpretation,
it was only the Pope & Talbot tribunal that did not adopt this
view.149
The preceding discussion is intended to show that it is reason-
able for the Commission to interpret the word "including" in Arti-
cle 1105 not to incorporate the heightened standard of treatment
contained in some BITs. Consideration must also be given to
whether the phrase "in accordance with international law" can rea-
sonably be interpreted as a reference to customary international
law. Again, Article 1105 must be read in context. It is clear that
Article 1105 is about establishing a minimum standard of treat-
ment. The international minimum standard of treatment of aliens
is an international law principle with an established pedigree. To
"establish what is meant by the minimum standard [Article 1105]
has to refer to general international law which has long tradition-
ally defined the requirements of a minimum standard for the
treatment of aliens - the treatment of aliens generally and not only
in terms of investment."150 There is a long list of available sources
148 Gantz, supra note 55, at 746. By way of example, in his decision in Metal-
clad, Mr. Justice Tysoe states that the interpretation of the word "including" in Ar-
ticle 1105 to mean "plus" -by reference to the wording of the U.S. Model BIT-is
incorrect because these words have virtually an opposite meaning. Tysoe sug-
gests that this interpretation is "contrary to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Conven-
tion, which requires that terms of treaties be given their ordinary meaning." See
Metalclad Corp., supra note 80, para. 65.
149 See Gantz, supra note 55, at 746 (contrasting the Pope & Talbot tribunal's
interpretation).
150 Jennings Opinion in Loewen, supra note 124, para. 30.
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to determine what the international law standard is, including in-
terndtional arbitral and judicial decisions,' 5' the works of respected
publicists, 5 2 state practice, and draft treaty texts, although at-
tempts to codify the standard in multilateral treaties respecting
state responsibility for injuries to aliens have failed. 5 3
The Commission's reference to customary international law is
only needed to clarify that the standard that Article 1105 refers to is
the international minimum standard for injuries to aliens, with its
long history and rich pool of interpretive sources. Article 1105
does not refer to standards established in other treaties for other
purposes and in other contexts. A provision in a treaty setting out
a particular standard for the purposes of the WTO regime, for ex-
ample, will not be applicable unless it represents a codification of
the customary international law norm respecting state responsibil-
ity for injuries to aliens. On the other hand, if a multilateral treaty
respecting state responsibility for injuries to aliens were concluded,
to the extent that it expressed customary international law norms,
it would be applicable "international law" for the purpose of iden-
tifying the minimum standard of treatment under Article 1105. In
other words, the Commission Statement need not be regarded as
an attempt to circumvent accepted processes of international law-
making or the doctrine of sources; arguably, it simply serves to
discipline roaming interpretations by clarifying that the relevant
sources of international law in the interpretation of Article 1105 are
those relevant to the minimum standard of treatment for aliens.
The foregoing comments addressing the first and second con-
cerns regarding the Commission Statement suggest that the Com-
mission has advanced a reasonable interpretation of Article 1105
15 See, e.g., Chattin v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.I.A.A. 282
(1927), [hereinafter Chattin] (discussing treatment of an American national by the
Mexican justice system); Denham Claim (U.S. v. Pan.), Hunt's Report 500 (1934),
[hereinafter Denham Claim] (reviewing the administration of justice in Panama's
interpretation of a contrast involving a U.S. national); Barcelona Traction, Light &
Power Co. (BeIg. v. Spain), Limited: Second Phase, 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
152 See C. AMERISINGHE, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 742 (1967)
(discussing the issue comprehensively); L. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2001) 742-819 (discussing state responsibility for
injuries to aliens); FREEMAN, supra note 35.
153 See generally F. V. GARCIA-AMADOR ET AL., RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE
LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (1974) (discussing efforts to
codify the law of state responsibility for injuries to aliens, with extensive commen-
tary about the doctrine and related principles).
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that does not amount to an amendment and does not violate appli-
cable rules of treaty interpretation.
The third concern raises questions about how the Commission
Statement itself should be interpreted: does the Commission mean
to say (1) that the customary international law standard somehow
subsumes the words "fair and equitable treatment" and "full pro-
tection and security"; (2) that it can perhaps be expressed by those
words without enhancing the level of treatment; or (3) that those
words are simply superfluous and have no meaning? If it intends
the latter, the Commission would appear to have exceeded its au-
thority. Attributing no meaning to words that appear in an agree-
ment amounts to both an attempt to amend the agreement and an
interpretation that does not comply with applicable rules of inter-
national law for the interpretation of treaties. The first two possi-
bilities are relevant to the discussion in Section 3 below regarding
the meaning of the minimum standard of treatment in customary
international law.
A fourth possibility is that suggested by Brower. Perhaps the
Commission means to say that the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment has evolved to include the height-
ened standard in U.S. BITs.154 If that is the case, whether the word
"and" or "including" is used no longer has any bearing on the level
of standard that is established. This view relates both to the
broader debate about the effect of BITs on customary international
law and to the specific matter of the interpretation of the Commis-
sion Statement itself.
It has been argued that the proliferation of BITs has established
a customary international law norm that has evolved beyond the
basic minimum standard of treatment to encompass concepts of
fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.155 A
component of the global trend towards economic liberalism, bilat-
eral investment treaties have become widely used by a number of
States, particularly since the 1970s. Writing in 1998, Vandevelde
reported that "[m]ore than 160 countries have concluded at least
154 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 10.
155 See Methanex Letter, supra note 95, at 7-11 (citing arguments to that effect
by, for example, Antonio R. Parra, Applicable Substantive Law in ICSID Arbitrations
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one BIT and a total of more than 1300 such agreements have been
signed, all involving at least one developing state."156 At a recent
conference, the number of BITs worldwide was reported to be
greater than 2000.157 These BITs form an extensive protective web
for foreign investors whose home and host countries are parties.
On the basis that BITs represent arrangements in which both
sides receive benefits and make concessions through bargaining,
rather than arrangements entered into out of a sense that they re-
flect the "general practice accepted as law" referred to in Article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 5 8 has led others
to contend that the customary international law on these issues
continues to be unsettled. 5 9 The wide adoption of BITs by devel-
oping countries has been attributed to the economic competition
among them.1 60 By this view, developing countries enter into BITs
in some sense because they are forced to in order to participate in
the global economy and compete with their neighbors, rather than
because they accept their terms as expressions of opinio juris. The
conclusion is not limited to developing countries: "In effect, each
BIT reflects the promotion and protection of each country's interest
156 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Investment Liberalization and Economic Development:
The Role of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 501, 503 (1998)
(discussing the impact of BITs on customary international law and suggesting that
the web of BITs is helping to develop custom in the area). For a detailed discus-
sion about BITs, see generally RUDOLF DoLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES (1995).
157 Abby Cohen Smutny, Speech at New York University School of Law Con-
ference: Regulatory Expropriations in International Law (Apr. 26, 2002).
158 Statute of the International Court of Justice [I.C.J.], June 16, 1945, art. 38, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060 (providing that the International Court of Justice is to apply inter-
national conventions, international customs, general principles of law, and, as a
subsidiary means, the judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists).
159 See Justine Daly, Has Mexico Crossed the Border on State Responsibility for
Economic Injury to Aliens? Foreign Investment and the Calvo Clause in Mexico after the
NAFTA, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1147, 1162-71, 1180-93 (1994) (discussing Mexico's ap-
proach to State responsibility for injury to aliens since the end of the nineteenth
century, from its adoption of the Calvo Clause in its Constitution to its ratification
of NAFTA). The Calvo Clause is based on a doctrine of the same name which
postulates that States need only afford aliens access to domestic courts and that no
additional protection of foreign investors is required. Id. at 1163-64.
160 See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explain-
ing the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 660-80 (1998)
(discussing the popularity of BITs among developing countries despite what the
author regards as the BITs' detrimental impacts on those countries).
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and the principles of law that are distilled into each treaty are es-
sentially a by-product of an exchange of quid pro quo between the
negotiating parties."16'
Quite apart from the unsettled broader debate respecting the
effect of BITs on customary international law, it has been suggested
that the Commission Statement itself expresses opinio juris to the
effect that the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment has evolved to embrace the heightened BIT standard.
162
However, the important differences in wording between the rele-
vant BIT provision and Article 1105, and the fact that the Parties
did not enter into BITs among themselves before entering into
NAFTA, militate against such a view. These factors suggest that
the Commission Statement is more likely an expression of opinio
juris to the effect that the minimum standard of treatment that is
applicable between the Parties is the customary law standard in-
stead of the heightened standard set out in the U.S. Model BIT.
It is arguable that the Commission Statement should be inter-
preted in light of events surrounding it. The fact that the NAFTA
Parties have repeatedly argued in proceedings that the applicable
standard in Article 1105 is not a heightened BIT-type standard and
that the trade ministers of the Parties have raised concerns about
certain interpretations that have been applied by arbitrators is dif-
ficult to ignore when interpreting the statement. On the other
hand, as discussed above, the Commission is established as a
NAFTA organ, not as a government mouthpiece. In this regard,
the Commission cannot assume that its Article 1131(2) statements
will be interpreted in accordance with the views expressed by the
NAFTA Parties. Although it is difficult to interpret the Commis-
sion Statement as Brower suggests, it is not impossible, and illus-
trates how important it is that the Commission and the Parties un-
derstand the limits of the Commission's role. The Commission
should not act as an extension of government, but as an independ-
ent institution with particular concrete responsibilities and powers
set out in NAFTA, the agreement pursuant to which its functions
are defined.
161 Bernard Kishoiyian, The Utility of Bilateral Investments Treaties in the Formu-
lation of Customary International Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 327, 373 (1994).
162 See, e.g., Mathanex Letter, supra note 95, at 7-11 (arguing that principles of
customary international law have adopted various investment protections).
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The last concern outlined above respecting the Commission
Statement is that its application to pending disputes is contrary to
international law. In Loewen, this ironically suggests that the be-
leaguered company may be denied justice both through the U.S.
legal system and through NAFTA dispute resolution. The issue as
to the effect of the Commission interpretation on pending disputes
will certainly not be resolved quietly; an ICSID lawyer included
the question in her list of emerging procedural issues for NAFTA
investor-to-State proceedings. 163
It is argued that both NAFTA itself and the applicable rules of
international law impose limits on the Commission in regard to
pending disputes. Brower suggests that Article 1115 requires that
the Parties uphold due process.M The provision does not really
say that though. It confirms that Part B of Chapter 11, which in-
cludes Article 1131(2), "establishes a mechanism for the settlement
of investment disputes that assures both equal treatment... and
due process."165 In other words, Article 1131(2) is arguably part of
the fair procedures established by Part B, ensuring equal treatment
and due process by offering a means to issue clarifications about
the meaning of NAFTA provisions thereby encouraging consis-
tency among arbitral tribunals.
Another issue concerns Article 1121(1)(a), which provides that
an "investor consents to arbitration in accordance with the proce-
dures set out in this Agreement."' 66 It might be argued that an in-
vestor consents to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of
the agreement as they are when the consent is submitted, not as
they are following modification by the Commission. In reply, it
can be argued that an investor consents to the agreement as writ-
ten, including the possibility that an interpretation could be issued
by the Commission pursuant to Article 1131(2), which is one of the
procedures set out in the Agreement.
Although the Commission might be able to defend its attempt
to apply its interpretation to pending disputes under applicable
163 See Eloise Obadia, Investment Treaties and Arbitration: Current and Emerging
Issues, ICSID NEWS, vol. 18, no. 2 (Fall 2001), at 4 (summarizing some issues that
are being addressed in ICSID arbitrations under NAFTA Chapter 11 and BITs), at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/news/n-18-2-4.htm.
164 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 12.
165 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1115.
166 Id. art. 1121(1)(a).
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provisions of NAFTA, it may have more difficulty doing so against
the charge that its approach contravenes general principles of pro-
cedural justice; namely equal treatment of the parties and the prin-
ciple that no one may be the judge of his own cause.167 In this case,
however, it might be argued that the substantially independent
role of the Commission within the framework of NAFTA helps it
defend its actions. Arguably, because the interpretation has been
issued pursuant to the Commission's 1131(2) authority, and not by
the NAFTA Parties themselves, the concerns raised by Brower are
inapplicable. All parties to a Chapter 11 dispute must take the
Agreement as they find it, including the possibility that the Com-
mission might issue an interpretation midstream during proceed-
ings.
Obviously, this is a point at which the distinction drawn be-
tween the Commission and the NAFTA Parties seems especially
difficult to maintain. It is unlikely that the Commission's role
within the framework of NAFTA alone will shield its statement
from review by the Loewen and Methanex tribunals. Indeed, for in-
ternational lawyers, it is fascinating to watch tribunals, disputing
investors, and the Parties grapple with the issues raised by the ad-
vent of the first Commission Statement and its impact on tribunal
jurisdiction and Commission authority.
On the one hand, regardless of whether the Commission
Statement represents a reasonably supportable interpretation of
Article 1105, or satisfies applicable limitations on the Commission's
authority, if any, there is reason to question whether a Chapter 11
tribunal has any jurisdiction to do anything other than apply the
statement. Article 1131 is divided into two subsections: 1131(1)
provides that tribunals must apply NAFTA and applicable rules of
international law; and 1131(2) is included as a separate proposition
adding Commission interpretations as an additional kind of gov-
erning law to be applied by tribunals.168 There is no language in
1131 suggesting that the Parties intended the interpretations them-
selves to be considered as possible subjects for Chapter 11 disputes
or as matters admitting to overriding quasi-judicial review by
NAFTA tribunals.169 Accordingly, it is arguably beyond the juris-
167 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 12.
168 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1131.
169 See id. (explicating the two legal frameworks).
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diction of a Chapter 11 tribunal to make the NAFTA Parties defend
their Commission Statements in investor-to-State dispute proceed-
ings.
Arbitrators might look to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia 70 and other international judicial bodies
for support for the development of an extensive judicial review
function based on a tribunal's compdtence de la compdtence. Indeed,
jurisdictional determinations are already routinely made by
NAFTA Chapter 11 tribunals. For example, the Loewen tribunal is-
sued a decision respecting a preliminary objection made by the
United States about the proper meaning to be accorded to the term
"measures" in Article 1101.171 Questions regarding the applicabil-
ity of the Commission Statement would seem to be of a more fun-
damental character, however. It is particularly so because the
Commission's authority is found in Part B-which establishes the
investor-to-State arbitration procedure -rather than in Part A-
which contains the substantive provisions. It is not clear how arbi-
trators who wade into questions about the scope of their authority
to review Commission Statements will address the impact of a lack
of stare decisis in Chapter 11 proceedings and an absence of a per-
manent "judicial" organ to ensure consistency. These features of
Chapter 11 could either be liberating or sobering; possibly depend-
ing on the character of the individual arbitrators involved.
Arbitration rules themselves generally address the matter of
arbitral jurisdiction. For example, Article 41 of the ICSID Conven-
tion provides that "a tribunal shall be the judge of its own compe-
tence."172 On the other hand, Article 1120(2) of NAFTA provides
that the "applicable arbitration rules shall govern the arbitration
170 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case IT-94-1-AR72
(Oct. 2, 1995), 35 LL.M. 32 (1996). In Tadic, the Appellate Chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia applied an expansive ap-
proach to questions concerning the scope of its jurisdiction. The Court argued
that "international tribunals constitute 'self-contained' systems with 'inherent' ju-
dicial powers," permitting them to respond to challenges to their lawful constitu-
tion even when this is not expressly indicated in their constitutive instrument. See
generally Jose E. Alvarez, Nuremberg Revisited: The Tadic Case, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 245
(1996).
171 Loewen Decision on Hearing on Competence and Jurisdiction, supra note
38.
172 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, art.
41.
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except to the extent modified by [Part B]." 173 The Commission's
power to issue authoritative and binding interpretations arguably
is such a modification. Even if a tribunal considers this to be cor-
rect, it can be expected to address these issues in some substantive
manner -particularly where, as in Loewen, the parties make sub-
missions that raise questions about the jurisdiction of the tribunal
in relation to the Commission Statement.174
In the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
("ICJ") concerning Namibia, the fact that the validity or conformity
with the U.N. Charter of a General Assembly resolution and a
number of Security Council resolutions was questioned was suffi-
cient for the Court to consider the query before determining any
legal consequences that could arise from such resolutions. 75 The
Court took this position despite its statement that "[u]ndoubtedly,
[it] does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect
of the decisions taken by the United Nations organs concerned." 176
Should a Chapter 11 tribunal determine that its jurisdiction to re-
view the validity of Commission Statements is limited, it may nev-
ertheless undertake such a review in an effort to address all issues
put before it. If a tribunal is so disposed, the legitimacy of the
Commission's actions might be brought into question-even if
their legality is not.
4.3. Summary
The foregoing discussion strongly suggests that the weight of
the argument seems to favor the view that the Commission has
acted within applicable limits; its statement is neither an amend-
173 NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1120(2).
174 For jurisdictional questions submitted in Loewen, see generally Canada's
Article 1128 Submission, supra note 86; Mexico's Article 1128 Submission, supra
note 86; U.S. Response to Article 1128 Submissions, supra note 86. See supra note
85 for information about the approach taken by the Pope & Talbot and Mondev tri-
bunals to the Commission Statement.
175 See Case Concerning the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Secu-
rity Council Resolution 276, 1970-71 I.C.J. 25, at 100 (uly 31, 1970) (showing that
the Court may have felt emboldened in the case because it was addressing a re-
quest for an advisory opinion, rather than a contentious matter-although the is-
sue of whether the case was properly characterized as advisory, rather than con-
tentious, was itself addressed by the Court).
176 Id. at 104.
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ment of NAFTA, nor is it an interpretation of Article 1105 that is
unsustainable under rules of international legal interpretation.
However, it is not clear whether the statement has clarified much
about the meaning of the minimum standard. This issue is dis-
cussed below in Section 5 of this Article.
Regardless of the conclusions that might be drawn from the
discussion in this Section of the Article with respect to the effec-
tiveness of the Commission Statement, the important point to be
drawn from it is that the Commission's authority to issue interpre-
tations is not unfettered. This has important implications for the
second NAFTA twist -the impact of the Agreement on issues of
public policy and of the common good -suggesting that the Com-
mission's capacity to address concerns relating to these issues is
limited.
5. THE MINIMUM STANDARD AFTER THE COMMISSION STATEMENT
Even if the Commission Statement is authoritative, it is still
questionable whether it clarifies much about the minimum stan-
dard of treatment. Confirming, as the Commission has attempted
to do, that there must be a violation of customary international law
for a breach of Article 1105 to arise, is only the first step. "A tribu-
nal, or reviewing national court, must still decide in each particular
case whether the subject action is in fact a violation of customary
international law," which is a difficult determination to make.177 In
particular, a tribunal must determine and define the applicable
standard.
The Doctrine of Denial of Justice has been called "one of the
oldest and most respected parts of the [international legal] sys-
tem."178 A review of the doctrine suggests that it is, indeed, old. It
has been both respected and maligned, and its meaning has always
been extremely difficult to pin down-making it a challenging doc-
trine to apply to particular facts. Indeed, in contrast to the asser-
tion that the doctrine is "most respected," Adede notes that it has
177 Gantz, Potential Conflicts, supra note 55, at 746.
178 Jennings Opinion in Loewen, supra note 124, at para. 18.
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also been called "mal lucide," 179 "least understood," and "much-
abused."180
The ancient roots of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice prompted
Spiegel to write in 1938 that its history "throws light on some of the
most important institutions of modem international law." 181 His-
torically, denial of justice was associated with the term "reprisals,"
which can be defined as any action taken by an individual or State
in retaliation, return, or satisfaction for an injury committed or al-
leged to have been committed by another. 182 Spiegel suggests that
these two terms arose from the ideas of self-help and responsibility
of individuals for acts committed by their peers. An early version
of this principle is described in the following way: "The law of the
Visigoths sanctioned reprisals against a judge who denied justice
to individuals not domiciled within the jurisdiction. If there [were]
no goods of the judge in the neighborhood, the reprisals may be
employed against anybody who is living in the territory of the
judge at fault."183
Freeman argues that by the fourteenth century, two clear prin-
ciples which argued for the contemporary iteration of the Doctrine
of Denial of Justice had become operative: first, that an individual
could carry out a reprisal against the State or community in which
he was denied justice on his own behalf; also, second, because pri-
vate reprisals are an extraordinary remedy, local remedies must
first be exhausted.184 With the rise of nation-states and their emer-
gence as the principal subjects of international law, the notion of
private reprisals was replaced by doctrines of State responsibil-
ity.185
179 "Mal lucide" means "poorly elucidated."
180 A. 0. Adede, A Fresh Look at the Meaning of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice
Under International Law, 14 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 73, 74 (1976) (reviewing denial of jus-
tice from a mid-1970's perspective). For an earlier discussion of denial of justice,
see J. W. Garner, International Responsibility of States for Judgments of Courts and
Verdicts of Juries Amounting to Denial of Justice, 1929 BaRT. Y.B. INT'L L. 181 (discuss-
ing the doctrine of denial of justice as applied in State-to-State arbitrations in the
early part of the twentieth century).
181 Spiegel, supra note 35, at 63.
182 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1302 (6th ed. 1990).
183 Spiegel, supra note 35, at 65.
184 See FREEMAN, supra note 35, at 55-56 ("[As] early as the fourteenth century,
a clear recognition of two principles [emerged].").
185 See id. at 62 ("Reprisals could now be exercised only by the state.").
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The phrase "denial of justice" has generally been used in three
senses.186 Broadly, the phrase has been applied to all types of
wrongful conduct on the part of a State towards aliens -whether
committed by the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of
government. In the narrow sense, the phrase has been limited to
situations where an alien is denied access to a State's judicial sys-
tem. The phrase is also used in an intermediate sense in connec-
tion with the improper administration of civil and criminal justice
with respect to aliens. In relation to the intermediate sense of the
phrase, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES enumerates a selection of irregular conduct
that arguably falls below this standard including "denial of trial or
other proceedings," "unfair trial or other proceedings," and an
"unjust determination." 187
Adede suggests that cases and writings all "[concentrate]
mainly upon the conduct that has most frequently been regarded
as constituting denial of justice." 88 This term is defined largely by
reference to examples. This poses a challenge for NAFTA arbitra-
tors. The cases available, for example, addressing "denial of jus-
tice" through deficient judicial proceedings generally concern in-
dividual aliens in civil or criminal proceedings in the early
twentieth century rather than modern commercial disputes involv-
ing large corporations. For example, Chattin v. United Mexican
States (United States v. Mexico), an arbitration by the Mexico/U.S.
General Claims Commission, involved a 1927 claim by the United
States against Mexico on behalf of an American citizen who was
convicted in Mexico of embezzling from his employer. 8 9 The is-
sue, in which the United States was successful, concerned short-
comings in the criminal procedure that was applied. It has been
suggested that it would be a "startling anachronism" to try to ap-
ply to investors and investments of today the standards for the
protection of aliens in criminal cases arising in the 1920s.190 How-
186 The three senses in which the term is used are described in GARCIA-
AMADOR, supra note 153, at 180.
187 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§§ 180-82 (1965).
188 Adede, supra note 180, at 74.
189 Chattin, supra note 151, para. 1.
190 Jennings Second Methanex Opinion, supra note 87, at 3.
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ever, a review of such cases suggests that these standards are more
applicable than might be expected.
In Chattin, the Presiding Commissioner stated that acts of the
judiciary "are not considered insufficient unless the wrong com-
mitted amounts to an outrage, bad faith, willful neglect of duty, or
insufficiency of action apparent to any unbiased man." 191 The ap-
plication of such a standard reflects the view that an especially
high degree of deference should be accorded to a State's judiciary.
It has also been stated that "it is a matter of the greatest political
and international delicacy for one country not to acknowledge the
judicial decision of a court of another country.'1 92
The Presiding Commissioner in Chattin also continued that in
"cases of direct responsibility, insufficiency of governmental action
entailing liability is not limited to flagrant cases such as cases of
bad faith or willful neglect of duty." 93 Direct responsibility re-
ferred to acts of organs of government other than the judiciary, in-
cluding the executive and legislative branches. The Commissioner
suggested that States must only accord protection against the
higher outrageous standard identified above in the case of any in-
direct liability it incurs for acts of "others."
Chattin is very useful for distinguishing between the applica-
tion of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice to judicial deficiencies and
its application to other acts engendering governmental responsibil-
ity. As suggested above, the term "denial of justice" has often been
broadly applied to all internationally wrongful acts in the follow-
ing way: "[W]hen an alien is unable to secure from the authorities
of the receiving state that minimum of security of life and property
to which he is entitled under international law, he is 'denied jus-
tice."1 94
Freeman objects to this broad application of the term. Instead,
he adopts the distinction drawn in Chattin whereby the minimum
standard is more onerous when applied to direct government ac-
tion, such as to acts of the executive or legislative branches, than
191 Chattin, supra note 151, para. 10.
192 Id. para. 11.
193 Id. para. 10.




ARBITRATION WITH TWO TWISTS
when it is applied to judicial action.195 It has been noted that the
standard is dependent on the person who is responsible for the act
in question (for example, a judge versus an administrative official),
and the circumstances that exist in the State (for example, crisis
versus semblance of normality).196
The association of the Commission Statement with the "antedi-
luvian rules prohibiting 'egregious,' 'outrageous,' and 'shocking'
government conduct"197 may obscure the nuances of a standard
that varies depending on the nature of the act complained of. If
such an approach is applied to NAFTA Chapter 11, Loewen may
be left with a difficult standard for a denial of justice claim based
on its Mississippi judicial proceedings, which it may well be able to
satisfy in any event. However, investors that challenge the acts of
government officials or the failings of regulations may be entitled
to relief even where they can only provide evidence of a less outra-
geous injustice.
The United States set out its position respecting the interna-
tional minimum standard of treatment unsuccessfully in the 1934
Denham Claim.198 Referring to the following quote from the U.S.
Denham brief, Loewen asserts that the U.S. position in that case is
virtually the same as that favored by Loewen in its Chapter 11 arbi-
tration: "[Tihe foreign laws shall be applied to [aliens] in a just,
equitable, and impartial manner; that the due and ordinary meth-
195 Id. at 105-15 (setting out criticism of the "broad view" of denial of justice).
Freeman argues that the broad view renders the principle unnecessary and con-
fusing by collapsing all international delicts for which States might be responsible
into one. See id. at 114. One possible postulate underlying the broad view is that
State responsibility for injuries to aliens is engaged not only by the activity of the
judicial organs but also by the acts or omissions of the legislative and executive.
Although this postulate may be sound, the broad view can also be applied to nar-
row the application of the doctrine of State responsibility for injuries to aliens to
mere access to courts. It is the application of the broad view alongside a narrow
view of State responsibility that Freeman wishes to avoid for fear that important
State obligations under international law will be extinguished. See id. at 115.
196 Spiegel, supra note 35, at 79-80.
197 Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra. note 11, at 10.
198 See Denham Claim, supra note 151, at 500 (stating its position that there is
a minimum for fair treatment of foreigners required by international law, and if it
is not granted, there is a denial of justice); FREEMAN, supra note 35, at 104 (arguing
that the U.S. position is "nothing more than a different way of expressing the tra-
ditional broad view").
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ods of procedures should be adopted; that no arbitrary or unusual
steps or measures shall be taken."199
The problem for Loewen is that in Denham, the United States
incorrectly tried to apply a standard that is not applicable to judi-
cial proceedings. 200 Adede rejects the U.S. position in the case as an
overbroad attempt to "lump together the irregular acts of all
branches of a government injuring an alien and calling them denial
of justice .. .."201 Based on the more rigorous standard identified
in Chattin in relation to judicial acts, rather than the standard enun-
ciated by the United States in Denham, Loewen may well have to
satisfy the arbitrators that the Mississippi process fell below the
denial of justice standard in a way that is outrageous and apparent
to any rational person. Luckily for Loewen, the Mississippi pro-
ceeding just might be egregious enough to satisfy the test.
On the other hand, the problem for the NAFTA Parties is that
they have been pressing arbitrators to adopt a standard -the cus-
tomary international law minimum standard for treatment of
aliens -that was not meant to be applied uniformly to all acts of
governments. Even without the heightened standard set out in
BITs and encouraged by disputing investors, the customary inter-
national law standard is likely higher than the standard the
NAFTA Parties have asserted, at least in relation to non-judicial
acts attributed to governments. In determining whether the cus-
tomary international law minimum standard for treatment of
aliens has been violated in any particular case, the use of such sub-
jective words as used by the United States in Denham like "just,"
"equitable," and "impartial" (and it can be inferred "fair") would
seem to be unavoidable. It might well be asked, therefore, what
then is the difference between the customary international law
standard referred to by the Commission and the heightened stan-
dard supported by, for example, Brower.202
Mann has argued that "[tihe terms 'fair and equitable treat-
ment' envisage conduct which goes far beyond the minimum stan-
199 Loewen Joint Reply to Article 1128 Submissions of Canada and Mexico,
supra note 86, at 6 (quoting Denhan Claim (U.S. v. Pan. 1933), U.S. Brief at 71).
200 FREEMAN, supra note 35, at 104.
201 Adede, supra note 180, at 88.
202 See Brower, Fair and Equitable Treatment, supra note 11, at 9-11 (arguing that
Article 1105 allows too many claims to be brought, therefore the international law
standard must be raised to limit abuse).
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dard and afford protection to a greater extent and according to a
much more objective standard than any previously employed form
of words." 2 3 As a result, he suggests that in the context of BITs
there is nothing to be gained by introducing the concept of a
minimum standard to accompany the fair and equitable standard
since governments that satisfy the latter will necessarily satisfy the
former.204 Significantly, he does not conflate the fair and equitable
standard, independently described, with the international law
minimum standard of treatment. The difference between the two
positions identified above then must reside in the difference be-
tween the infamous "and" in the U.S. Model BIT, which unneces-
sarily connects the lofty fair and equitable terminology with its
lowly cousin the minimum standard, and the communal "includ-
ing" in Article 1105, which protects investors under the wing of the
minimum standard, an international doctrine that sets a floor for
government action. That floor appears to be neither as high as the
BIT informed position, nor as low as the "outrageous" position ap-
plicable to denials of justice arising from judicial proceedings.
The Commission may have clarified some matters, but many
more questions will be raised. The likelihood that the NAFTA Par-
ties will find future decisions addressing Article 1105 objectionable
may not have been markedly reduced since all of the same argu-
ments about the relationship of other treaties to NAFTA, the im-
pact of provisions outside Chapter 11, the applicable standards,
and the relationship of Chapter 11 provisions to each other will still
be made but now in the context of the question: what constitutes
customary international law? The Parties may have hoped that, at
the very least, they succeeded in clarifying that the "something ex-
tra" that some investors (and arbitrators) have found in Article
1105 is not really there.205 Possibly, to their chagrin, the Parties
may be surprised to find that, even if the heightened standard does
23 F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, in
FURTHER STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 234, 238 (F. A. Mann ed., 1990) (broadly
discussing the British bilateral investment treaty, including provisions respecting
fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors).
204 Id.
205 See Mondev, supra note 32, paras. 110-20 (explaining that the tribunal
found, partly on the basis of U.S. statements respecting its own BITs, and partly
on the basis of the vast number of bilateral and regional investment treaties pro-
viding for fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors, that customary inter-
national law has evolved to incorporate the heightened BIT standard).
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not apply, they are left with a standard that is perhaps somewhat
more rigorous when applied to government action outside the ju-
dicial branch than they had hoped. This will be an important con-
sideration in their efforts to negotiate the investor protection terms
of the FTAA.
6. SOME IMPLICATIONS
The availability of Commission intervention in Chapter 11 dis-
putes adds a severe twist to investor-to-State dispute resolution. It
makes the NAFTA model look less like commercial arbitration and
more like a hybrid that combines impartial third party adjudication
with a mechanism for intervention in proceedings by a supervisory
organ that is established to carry out certain independent functions
in relation to NAFTA but is inextricably linked to the NAFTA Par-
ties at the executive level. This mechanism can be used to alter in-
vestors' prospects for successful claims, possibly even when such
claims are in midstream. In this way, Chapter 11 dispute resolu-
tion includes both impartial and partial elements. This framework
arguably reflects the fact that the NAFTA Parties negotiated the
terms of the agreement both as "potential defendants in Chapter 11
cases," and "as representatives for their nationals who would be
claimants in cases against [the] other state Parties,"2°0 not to men-
tion as representatives of their respective national interests.
With the advent of the first Commission interpretation, it is
tempting to breathlessly profess that Article 1131(2) will permit a
periodic re-balancing of important public interest goals and inves-
tor rights. The discussion in Sections 4 and 5 of the Article sug-
gests that the Commission cannot be expected to play that role. Its
powers to interpret provisions of the Agreement are limited and,
due to complexities in the Agreement and in international law, its
capacity to clarify matters is also constrained. Further, the impact
of 1131 to date is extremely modest. First of all, the difficulties that
the Commission had in arriving at just one interpretation have
206 See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer and In-
vestor Acceptance, 2 CHI. J. IlN'L L. 183, 184 (2001) (discussing NAFTA as a contract
negotiated by sovereign States to address their competing interests, protecting
their nationals abroad, and their own domestic interests).
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been noted.207 Secondly, many issues that have been the source of
public concern have been left untouched, including the impact of
Article 1110 on non-discriminatory environmental regulation.208
Third, tribunal response to Commission intervention has been
mixed.209
On a more positive note, although the Commission's approach
on access to documents in its statement only represents a baby step
towards the much more open procedure sought by public interest
groups and some in the academic community, at least it reflects a
level of appreciation among the Parties for public concerns about
what has been regarded as a largely secretive process. Similarly,
the Commission's interpretation of the minimum standard of
treatment can be viewed as a modest attempt to reign in the prolif-
eration of particularly creative, unexpected, and controversial in-
vestor claims in response both to public pressure and to the Par-
ties' own worries about tribunal approaches to the interpretation of
Article 1105.
On the other hand, the Statement gives rise to a number of
challenging questions about the scope of the Commission's author-
ity and the relationship between the Commission and tribunals,
and may be misinterpreted or viewed as ineffective by arbitrators,
which has left questions about the minimum standard of treatment
in Article 1105 unresolved. In addition, it remains to be seen how
207 See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 79
(discussing the benefits of the interpretation but also explaining additional con-
cerns needing to be addressed).
208 See MANN & VON MOLTKE, supra note 55, at 4-5 ("Most worrying in the
NAFTA context is the lack of clear guidelines to help distinguish between takings
subject to compensation and regulation that is not."); INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 79 ("The NAFTA Ministers need to
state clearly that non-discriminatory laws serving broad public interests such as
environment and public health should enjoy the police powers exemption from
Article 1100 obligations."); PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 51, at x-xi ("The regulatory
takings provisions of Article 1110 has drawn the most fire, but the trade ministers
refuse to provide an interpretation of the provision or in any way limit is
use....").
209 Compare Pope & Talbot, supra note 85, paras. 23-24 (questioning whether it
had to apply the Commission Statement on the basis that it amounts to an
amendment of Chapter 11, not an interpretation) with Mondev, supra note 32,
paras. 121-25 (applying the Commission interpretation, but arguing that custom-
ary international law includes the heightened BIT standard based on the inclusion
of the terms "fair and equitable" and "full protection and security" in NAFTA Ar-
ticle 1105 and in the vast number of BITs in the world).
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frequently, if ever again, the Commission will agree to use Article
1131(2), and whether it will use its authority to clarify NAFTA
provisions for bona fide public interest reasons, or simply abuse it
when convenient to avoid expensive arbitral awards justifiably
arising from wrongful missteps by NAFTA governments.
Commission intervention may have some unintended conse-
quences. For example, Chapter 11 arbitrators, generally experts
who favor investor rights regimes, may feel free to render deci-
sions that expand such rights on the basis that if they go too far, the
Commission will issue a statement to reign in future tribunals. The
fact that the Commission is made up of the representatives of only
three States gives the impression that Article 1131 interventions
should be easier than is the case for the more than 140 members of
the WTO. In that regime the permanent Appellate Body might feel
restrained, in the interests of its legitimacy, by the fact that the nu-
merous WTO Members cannot easily reach a consensus to reject
Appellate Body decisions or make rules respecting matters of in-
terpretation to address any "excesses" of the judicial body. The
fact that there is no permanent adjudicative body to address Chap-
ter 11 claims may contribute to an atmosphere favoring an expan-
sive approach to investor rights.
On the other hand, the advent of a Commission Statement fol-
lowing a few years of disagreement among the Parties as to the ex-
istence of a problem, together with the substantial attention that
NAFTA Chapter 11 claims are receiving in the media, suggests that
arbitrators should instead exercise judicious restraint for fear that
the Parties might otherwise discard investor-to-State arbitration, or
significantly modify or eliminate their role.210
7. CONCLUSION .
The Commission interpretation is doubtless seen as a step
backwards by foreign investors, leaving them with a less rigorous
minimum standard of treatment than they had hoped. It is inter-
esting here to note the considerable impact of an additional feature
of NAFTA differentiating it from most BITs. As indicated above,
Vandevelde wrote in 1998 that every BIT had a developing country
210 See Bjorklund, supra note 206, at 191 (implying that arbitrators should be
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as one of its parties.211 NAFTA is a treaty between three countries
with well-developed economies. This configuration has meant that
NAFTA is the first investment treaty that has brought about claims
against the United States. Loewen and Methanex, which together
claim approximately two billion dollars in damages, are cases in
which the shoe is on the other foot: the United States finds itself
defending its own judicial system and environmental regulations
rather than encouraging improvements to those of developing
States. A similar comment can be made in relation to Canada and
some of the claims that have been leveled against it.
Chapter 11 arbitrations provide proof, for those who may have
had any doubt, that no political, legal, or economic system is im-
mune to scrutiny from the perspective of international standards.
This is particularly striking when cases like Metalclad and Loewen
are reviewed. It becomes apparent that in some cases investor
remedies seem justified. The reaction of the NAFTA Parties to
these and other Chapter 11 claims will have implications for FTAA
negotiations, for current and future BITs, and for any multilateral
investment treaty negotiations. Many countries are likely inter-
ested to see what looks like a retreat by the United States from a
position favoring robust protection for its investors abroad.
The intervention of the Free Trade Commission in Chapter 11
dispute resolution through its July 31, 2001, statement, and of the
NAFTA Parties through judicial review applications of arbitral
awards, may foreshadow the emergence of a subsidiarity doctrine
in the increasingly integrated Americas; an effort to ensure that
alongside the development of international institutions, local mat-
ters are addressed locally to the greatest extent possible.212 In that
regard, NAFTA Chapter 11 may not represent the preferred model
of the Parties for investor-to-State disputes, but a stage in a devel-
oping inter-state system that might eventually be replaced by an
ambitious new design. Opponents of NAFTA might view the posi-
tion of the Parties as offering attractive opportunities to lobby for
additional modifications to NAFTA and for an FTAA, if one is con-
211 Vandevelde, supra note 156, at 503.
212 See Richard Sinnott, Integration Theory, Subsidiarity and the Internationaliza-
tion of Issues: The Implication for Legitimacy (discussing subsidiarity), available at
http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/ecsaworld2/sinnott.htm (last visited May
2, 2003).
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cluded at all, that is more farsighted, taking into account a broader
range of interests so that it too does not become a bizarre human
rights treaty for investors, but a piece of an expanding body of in-
ternational law and institutional practice united in respect for hu-
man rights and the common good.213
Finally, it is clear that the appearance of investor rights provi-
sions and of an investor-to-State dispute resolution mechanism in
Chapter 11 present conceptual challenges to international lawyers
who are both committed to the expansion of the rule of law, but
sensitive to the inequities that can result from attempts to do so in
a vacuum. A deep concern with Chapter 11 is that it appears to
privilege an already generously privileged class. On the other
hand, it is difficult to argue that an international investor should
not be able to expect a minimum standard of treatment that, where
necessary, may rise above the standard generally available in a
particular locality.
Investor-to-State dispute resolution is regarded as a component
of a trend that is changing the traditional framework of interna-
tional law and international relations. "State sovereignty" is under
challenge first, as inappropriate and sometimes dangerous termi-
nology that has been used to justify human rights abuses,214 and,
second, as an outdated description of an international legal system
that States dominate less and less, with international organizations,
individuals, indigenous peoples, non-governmental organizations,
and multinational corporations playing an increasingly important
role. Further, on one hand, such fields as international economic
law, human rights law, international environmental law, and the
law of international organizations have emerged in the twentieth
century as distinct areas of international legal practice. On the
other hand, the interrelationship between all of the players in the
field of international law and relations is a growing area of inquiry
and debate.
213 See Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Constitutionalism, and Human Rights: An Over-
view, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 132, 132-34 (2002) (discussing how human rights
can be integrated into the FTAA).
214 See Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) (discussing the often confused us-
age of the term "sovereignty").
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NAFTA Chapter 11 is, as Alvarez has suggested, a human
rights treaty for investors.215 At bottom the concerns it generates
appear to be linked to uneasiness about the idea of conferring
rights on a privileged and limited class without ensuring that they
are fairly restrained by duties to all of those who do not participate
in the benefits they enjoy. Increased transparency beyond that es-
tablished by the Commission interpretation would be helpful in
that it may encourage a review of linkages between investor rights
and other issues. The adoption of other measures in NAFTA or fu-
ture agreements like it that permit the balancing of legitimate in-
terests is also required. Commission interpretations, the first twist
in NAFTA investor-to-State dispute resolution, are not enough to
address the second twist-the impact of the regime on issues of
public policy and of the common good. More comprehensive re-
form is required to address the second twist than can be under-
taken by the Commission within the limited framework it has un-
der NAFTA.
215 Alvarez, Critical Theory, supra note 77, at 307-08.
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